TTA’s Autumn Leaves: Oura puts off IPO, Anthropic’s IPO November (?); Sycamore Partners nearing Boots sale; telehealth support for pediatricians in youth mental health, Oracle’s Congressional spanking, more!

 

2-5 October 2026

Here we are past the first week of Fall (or Autumn). The leaves may be turning, but the healthcare/AI  IPOs aren’t, with the Oura health monitoring ring postponing its IPO indefinitely and the Anthropic AI rumored only for early-to-mid-November. Another turning is for Boots, with Sycamore Partners breaking up the Walgreens Boots Alliance combine for $9 billion. And this week’s Perspectives discusses the burden pediatricians are taking on in youth mental health and how telehealth can support this need.

For Readers: Your Editor will be on publishing leave due to travel to 21 October. ‘Best Of’ Alerts will be out weekly on Fridays and Saturdays after this week till then. Some past highlights:

  • Humanity’s Rumored Doom in 10 years at the hands of AI are Zebras, not Horses.
  • Oracle’s simultaneous strong Q1, 3,000 layoffs, and its two top execs subpoenaed by the House VA Committee for a whacking over the 170% increase in budget to cover the next three years (Congress is Fed Up).
  • How infrastructure tech needed by healthcare organizations can’t get arrested on funding, while whiz-bang consumer apps can.

Please feel free to comment on the articles and pass along this Alert. Let me know if this is worth it to you! Also check out my personal page on Substack.

IPOs, IPOs–Oura’s stalls out, Anthropic’s restarts, possibly mid-November. To everyone’s amazement!

Developing: Walgreens’ Sycamore Partners owner on final approach to sell Boots operation to Canada’s Weston family for ~$9B

Perspectives: What Meta’s settlement reveals about youth mental health, access shortages, and where telehealth can support pediatricians

More of Interest 

Oracle’s continued restructuring cuts 3K more jobs, adds $700 million while revenue grows 30%; House VA Committee subpoenas Ellison, Sicilia 19-0–and why Congress is mad at a 170% budget increase (Updated for how Congress really feels)

(Related) Revealed: Oracle’s extended VA EHRM contract increased by $17B as original ceiling reached this year; VA Indy EHR goes online

AI’s hoofbeats as Horses, not Zebras: a Gimlety view of AI’s destructive capacity (updated) (P(doom) may be conquered by F(doom), or Why Worry?

Perspectives: Digital Health Capital Keeps Rewarding What Patients See, Not What Keeps Companies Alive (Infrastructure tech can’t get funding)

Silicon Valley Bank’s take on H1 investment: among the “have and have nots”, it was “the best half in years” for health tech

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Telehealth & Telecare Aware – covering news on latest developments in telecare, telehealth and eHealth, worldwide.

IPOs, IPOs–Oura’s stalls out, Anthropic’s restarts, possibly mid-November. To everyone’s amazement!

Is it the market, or is it something else that’s putting off the ‘sure’ IPOs? The smart money was betting that the Oura health monitoring ring would have IPO’d on Wednesday (30 Sept) for about $2.1 billion. The employees holding restricted stock units (RSU) and investors would be counting their money by now. After all, Oura has been profitable this year after breaking even in 2025, and there was real enthusiasm when it filed its SEC S-1 right before Labor Day. But on 29 September, when the offering was scheduled to price, it was postponed. Indefinitely.

The Oura press release cited “that it is postponing its previously announced initial public offering on Nasdaq, despite strong demand, due to uncertainty in the IPO market”. No new date was given. Uncertainty is a factor, but there are others specific to Oura.

If you read Endpoints, they cited the Federal Reserve raising its rates a few weeks ago, depressing demand for the rich valuation Oura was seeking; the P(doom) around AI; and Apple introducing a new Watch with improved sensors and an option to order blood tests, as Oura has. There are rumors that Apple will also develop a faceless watch that will copy everything that Oura has. That’s a lot of putting off right there.

Ace investigator Sergei Polevikov in his AI Health Uncut of 29 September digs considerably deeper. Non-subscribers to his Substack platform will see some of this but his main points are that the oversubscribing level was weak at ~4x whereas ~20x for large offerings has been the norm since 2023. Three early VCs-Forerunner, Lifeline, and Elysian Park Ventures–were seeking to exit, never a good sign, and taking $1.53 billion with them. The IPO is also being built on Oura’s promise to deliver predictive health. Whether a ring–a piece of Finnish jewelry–can deliver that and more, reliably and interestingly to a growing user base, is a real question.

What 4x versus 20x says is that this IPO is a ‘nice to have’, not a ‘must have’. No one here has FOMO–fear of missing out.

There are hardware issues–and hardware is the vast bulk of its sales with service subscriptions only 19.8% of revenue.

Last but certainly not least, Oura’s benefit in going public on Nasdaq would largely have gone to the Taxman. Little known fact unless you’ve Been There, Done That: RSUs are treated as employee pay when they vest. The tax is withheld, just like wages. It becomes the employer responsibility, not the employee’s. In net settlement, Oura pays the tax in cash from its IPO proceeds and keeps part of the shares to cover the tax. (That doesn’t count what states do with RSUs nor how laws differ internationally.)

The line on the bottom for Oura after the IPO? The company nets only a paltry $6.2 million because of investor payoff and employee RSU taxation. That is over 98% of the proceeds going to everyone but Oura. 

Have other IPOs been like this? Not many. Evidently a lot of pay went to RSUs spread generously around, not just executive staff. This IPO evidently is to help three major VCs exit nicely–and a ~4x oversubscription wasn’t enough.

Another Ominous Parallel with an IPO that some of us remember: Peloton, once a fitness darling. There are similarities (the enthusiasm, the unfavorable hardware issues, the imbalance between hardware and subscription revenue, unsustainable growth beyond enthusiasts) and differences (the Oura Ring is under $400, a Peloton machine over $2,000, and Oura is profitable). But you’ll have to subscribe (and you should!!) to Sergei’s Substack to see all of his finely worked out and fully buttressed argument.

Oura is not exactly hurting for financing, having raised $1.5 billion over the past decade, with a jumbo $900 million Series E last October led by Fidelity, and an undisclosed corporate round this past July led by Eli Lilly, neither of which are exiting.  Crunchbase

Will Oura IPO this year or next? This Editor cannot see anything that was cited as changing the picture if the IPO were tomorrow or in the next few months.  Also Mobihealthnews

About the Anthropic IPO, the financial press is agog with talk that its engines may restart by mid-November. The date is rumored to be 9 November. Anthropic executives will meet with investors on 14 October to build a case for a $2 trillion offering, which would be an all-time record for an IPO.

Readers know that the IPO talk, explored since May, came to a screeching halt right around 9/11 with the talk of P(doom) [TTA 17 Sept] and Federal regulation. Some believe that these ‘external brakes’ were applied because neither Anthropic nor OpenAI were ready to IPO and it was easier to create Doom than to postpone directly. But here we have it at least for Anthropic, even if the fundamentals scream “warning”! Certainly the incentive to beat OpenAI to the IPO is still there. Anthropic, which was created by OpenAI bolters, surely want to ring that bell on either Nasdaq or NYSE (another small matter to finalize) before Sam Altman. Here we go again! Yahoo Finance

TTA’s August Ice Cream Run 3: less activity is more for startups, hard looks at Commure and OpenAI, acquisitions by UHS, DocGo, R1–and UK’s Alertacall sold

20-24 August 2026

Enjoy the August Doldrums, because this fall might be awfully…eventful. Our Must Reads are rather Doomful, between exposés on General Catalyst and Commure’s business practices, plus OpenAI’s accelerating troubles that look like Sam Altman is flirting hard with the Devil of Demise. A positive Must Read is on early-stage funding–how doing less will get your company more. Our news roundup highlights several acquisitions and Anthropic partnering with EHR PointClickCare. Speaking of sales, UK’s Alertacall has been sold after great success, and will remain independent.

On the hot subject of AI writing and AI Copy Slop, find out how to spot and avoid it in our thoughts on why TTA remains stubbornly 100% Written By Humans. Grab the cuppa for this one. Else you’ll faint like Pepper!

Please feel free to comment on the articles and pass along this Alert. Let me know if this is worth it to you! Also check out my personal page on Substack.

This Week’s Must Reads: how lack of focus dooms startup financing, Commure’s Sea of Red Flags Flapping, and what happens if OpenAI expires?

News roundup: UHS-Talkspace $850M buy final, DocGo to buy Hicuity Health for $52M in stock/debt, R1 to buy Humata Health, PointClickCare EHR to integrate Anthropic’s AI

UK’s Alertacall sold to Constellation Software’s Volaris Group

Last week’s headlines

Why Readers can be assured that TTA is 100% Written by Humans (A handy guide to detecting AI Copy Slop)

News potpourri: OpenAI sued for practicing unlicensed medicine”, Cleveland Clinic med drone delivery, Solventum separates out health info systems, Unlimited Technology RCM in 3.8M data breach, Samsung Galaxy Buds FDA cleared for hearing assist

VA moves to secure Oracle for its EHR Modernization through mid-2031 (More reasons beyond the obvious)

Breaking report: Oracle drawing up plans to lay off employees in “double digit percentages” by 1 September (We’re waiting for this shoe to drop)

Recent Headlines and Must Reads

News roundup #2: Function Health’s jumbo $450M raise from General Catalyst, Hinge Health’s $105M Cylinder buy, and Throne Science’s $10M Series A

News roundup #1: AI governance ‘in’ with Feds, ATA; Centene’s shrinking but more profitable future; repositions and partnerships for DispatchHealth, WHOOP; Te Whatu Ora Health New Zealand modernization

Chutes & Ladders, Oracle Edition: Surprise! Project Jupiter data center build overages, “social costs” multiply. Pentagon inks $7B, 10 year deal for software.

This week’s Must Read: the dangerous financing of AI data center buildouts–and how they resemble the 2020 health tech boom (Remember the SPAC boom that cracked and left nearly all companies and billions in the dust?)

A gloomy view on Oracle going forward: debt, cash flow, and dependence on OpenAI

 

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Support not only a publication but also a well-informed international community.

Contact Editor Donna for more information.

Help Spread the News

Please tell your colleagues about this free news service and, if you have relevant information to share with the rest of the world, please let me know!

Donna Cusano, Editor In Chief
donna.cusano@telecareaware.com

This Week’s Must Reads: how lack of focus dooms startup financing, Commure’s Sea of Red Flags Flapping, and what happens if OpenAI expires?

Grab a cuppa and sit down with these articles. (You may also want to subscribe to their authors.)

From Substack, UK author Martyn Eeles current Health VC newsletter, “The Strategic Clarity Problem”, advises founders of early-stage companies that doing more can result in less–financing. Too much activity in too many directions leads to confusion on investors’ parts. Paradoxically, it doesn’t enhance “potential” but detracts. It reads to investors, especially now, as lack of priorities and not strategic. Mr. Eeles recommends focus, focus, focus. Choose a strategy and stick with it. It doesn’t mean that a founder cannot show multiple future paths, just that the main path has to carry the company forward. (Sounds like good marketing!)

For instance, how you present your direction is vital in making activity sound focused and strategic. FTA:

A founder who says, “There are many use cases,” may sound ambitious. A founder who says, “There are many possible use cases, but this one is the wedge because it creates the clearest buyer urgency,” sounds more investable.

A founder who says, “We have lots of partnership conversations,” may sound active. A founder who says, “These two partnerships matter because they reduce implementation risk and create access to the customer segment we are prioritising,” sounds strategic.

The short (non-subscriber) version has a wealth of information for both founders and funders, complete with a nifty infographic that depicts nearly the entire article. but truncates at ‘The Choices Investors Want To See”.  This Editor would recommend the annual €60 subscription if you’re in the business. Mr. Eeles is managing partner at Clarma Capital, a European life sciences venture fund.

Our friend Sergei Polevikov writing in his Substack AI Health Uncut returns to the General Catalyst-powered Commure in Commure’s Long History of Red Flags. Even though General Catalyst doesn’t want him to.  Yes, the flags still flap around the gaggle of health tech companies financed by General Catalyst (GC). Commure itself is an agglomeration of GC companies: Athelas, Augmedix, RxHealth, and Memora Health. Commure originally had one marketable product, Strongline, a safety and duress badging/tracking system, three years ago before GC’s consolidation moves. What is questionable about Commure has now surfaced in STAT News +’ investigation (paywalled). From pricing dependent on recommendations to products that don’t work until they’re modified at the client if they eventually do work, to referral programs that are way too close to violating the Anti-Kickback Statute…Commure has it all on the Shady Side of the Street. GC keeps shoveling money in because they can, too. 

And once again, thinking the unthinkable, is Ed Zitron. Here he imagines the demise of OpenAI and reads the tea leaves. He notes:

  • the deceleration of revenue when it needs to accelerate (see below)
  • the COO and CRO left after less than a year on the job, likely walking away from generous stock options/awards–now, who does this?
  • it’s backed away from its IPO and likely will be beaten to it by Anthropic (Claude)
  • the economics are terrifying. OpenAI lost $20.9 billion in 2025 on $13.07 billion in revenue
  • it needs to meet compute obligations and for that needs $800 billion in cash
  • it needs to raise $100-200 billion annually just to survive

In short, it has to become the most successful company since Caesar Crossed The Rubicon–or it croaks. Expires. Meets the Devil of Demise and the Devil wins.

The consequences will be severe. FTA:

To not actively and meaningfully discuss the potential for OpenAI to collapse is actively irresponsible. To act like there are not significant, existential problems with this company’s economics is to intentionally avoid reality, and whoever is on the receiving end of said ignorance deserves better, be they an investor reading your analyst note or a reader burdened with incomplete journalism.

What follows may be an Enron-Lehman Brothers hybrid, one that leaves unbelievable destruction in its wake, an avoidable systemic risk empowered and enabled by a kneecapped media industry and sell-side analysts incapable of seeing further than two quarters in the future.

The time to stop this? Long past.

Zitron backs everything up with hard numbers laced with cross-references. It’s dense and needs close attention. Depending on your view,  you’ll choose a gallon of coffee, a fifth of bourbon, or a bottle of wine. What Happens If OpenAI Dies?

Another argument, shorter, and similar, is made by Gary Marcus in his Substack newsletter (free access), Marcus on AI,  BREAKING: OpenAI’s unraveling has begun.  Again, just as it was scheduled for its IPO and racing its main competitor.

It contains two citations from the Wall Street Journal writers who cover OpenAI, Berber Jin and Corrie Dribusch:

  • “The company grew revenue by just 18% to $6.7 billion from q1 to q2, while its losses sank further into the red”
  • Losses grew from Q1 to Q2 to $3 billion to $12.3 billion, while it added only $1 billion (to $6.7 billion)

Nvidia is in full CYA mode, given its exposure to OpenAI. Can Oracle be far behind?

A Must-Read potpourri: the ‘math’ of AI data center builds, healthcare AI failures, telehealth in schools, Hippocratic AI’s problems, the loss of empathy.

Your Editor will be Away From The Desk more than a bit over the next two weeks that lead up to the US Memorial Day holiday. I’ve collected seven articles to read and consider over the next few days. Enjoy!

Where Are All The Data Centers?

Author: Ed Zitron.  Self-published on Where’s Your Ed At?

If you’re puzzled about the ‘math’ of data centers–what capacity is available now, what is actually online/operational, and what’s the pipeline like–you will appreciate the detail that Mr. Zitron has gone to in cataloging those and much more. It turns out that we are not in the Land of Math, but in the Land of Myth, ruled by the Great Oz.

Despite what the builders say, and Microsoft’s and Oracle’s ever-cheery press releases, operational data centers are a fraction of what’s needed now or projected. The centers take 18-24 months to build and then many more months to complete–to fit out with chips, cooling, power, and networking that links sites and the end users. The AI giants, despite all the money flowing their way, will run out of money before the operating capacity they need gets online. Every data center takes 18-24 months to build, and even with retrofitting older data centers, the capacity is not there, nor for some time to come. In other words, the cavalry is in a neighboring country, much less the next state. Nobody has yet built an operating 1 GW data center. Centers are in megawatts and that, not many MWs. 

FTA:

  • “Oracle is building 7.1GW of total capacity for OpenAI, and keeps — laughably! — saying 2027 or 2028, when at this rate, Stargate Abilene won’t be done until mid-2027, and the rest either never get finished or are done in 2030 or later.”
  • “This is setting up a horrifying situation where Oracle desperately needs OpenAI to pay it for capacity that doesn’t exist, and if it ever gets built, it’s likely to be years after OpenAI has run out of money, which is the same problem that Microsoft, Google, and Amazon have with their $748 billion of deals with Anthropic and OpenAI, though thanks to the $340 billion or more necessary to build the Stargate data centers, Oracle’s problems are far more existential.”

The article also makes the point that Oracle does not have the fallback businesses that Microsoft, Google, and Amazon have to cushion the blow of AI failure. Oracle has the bottomless pit of Oracle Health, only one part of which is the VA EHR. It has a crushing burden of a massive debt load, the most recent being financed by a large bond fund since banks wouldn’t touch it. It kicked 30,000 employees and their expertise  to the curb. Will Larry Ellison sell a yacht or an island to help finance this as a 40% owner? More in Oracle Steps Back From The Debt Brink and Oracle’s Rock and Hard Place in Abilene

This is one long, well-written, and researched analysis by Mr. Zitron, whose expertise is in PR and is a well-known Silicon Valley critic. 

Telehealth in Schools: Expanding Student Access in a Hybrid Health Care System

Author: Paul Samargedlis. Published on Telehealth.org

Healthcare shortages across the US are affecting K-12 schools and children’s health. School-based telehealth programs can reduce absenteeism, expand access to mental health care, and deliver preventive care, bringing that care to where children already are. School-based telehealth programs in states such as Texas and North Carolina have demonstrated measurable improvements in attendance and emergency department utilization. Much will have to change in coordinating efforts and obtaining funding among school systems, local providers, and governments.

Artificial Intelligence Acquisitions: Agencies Should Collect and Apply Lessons Learned to Improve Future Procurements

Author: Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congressional Requesters. April 2026 (49 pages)

Federal agencies reportedly more than doubled their use of artificial intelligence (AI) from 2023 to 2024, and they used a range of approaches to acquire additional AI capabilities through fiscal year 2025. In April 2025, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance to help agencies acquire AI responsibly, but agencies have not by and large shared that knowledge. This paper attempts to fill this gap in part. GAO identified trade-offs, challenges and benefits. The paper identifies approaches agencies made in acquisition and makes recommendations. The recommendations most impact DOW, DHS, GSA, and the VA.

Top AI Failures in Healthcare

Author: Dmitrii Gorbunov. Published on LinkedIn.

Mr. Gorbunov sums up five costly failures (or about to be failures) where AI has been used in healthcare: physician decision overrides (UnitedHealthcare), claims denials (Cigna), fabrications of consent documents (Sharp Healthcare), and adding diagnostic codes without physician confirmation (Kaiser Permanente). The fifth one, Doctronic, was spoofed by Mindguard to issue triple the dose of Oxycontin [TTA 26 Mar]. The lack of rules, audit and audit trails that can be confirmed and trusted will cost healthcare organizations money and already are having legal consequences.

The next may require subscription to view on Substack

The Architecture of Voice: Why AI Tools Can Mimic Style But Not The Voice

Stuart Miller (Haverin Consulting)’s fourth article on AI’s effect on language and writing. An AI LLM can partly fill two parts of the Competence Framework–Skills and Knowledge–but it does not have Experience. It is incomplete in these three points of Context, and Voice represents the accumulation of Context. FTA: “The dangerous part is the assumption that accelerated Knowledge substitutes for Experience, when in fact accelerated Knowledge, and improved Skills untethered from time, is precisely the recipe for the Builder’s Mirage. The Builder’s Mirage is the illusion of competence, produced without the underlying thing being present.”

Sergei Polevikov’s Substack under AI Health Uncut will require subscription to fully view. His latest are:

Hippocratic AI Fires Its International Sales Team

It’s turning into Theranos 2.0. FTA: “Revenue is an estimated $17–20M ARR. Burn rate is $404M.” Their customers are also their investors. and “Hippocratic AI has quietly withdrawn from all of its international markets, terminated every international contract, and let go of the international sales team that built those relationships.” Contracts were sold without country language versions, adequate GPU infrastructure, and compliance.

Christina Farr: “Where is all of our empathy? Where did it go?”

Christina Farr is the former CNBC healthcare tech reporter, founder of  Second Opinion Media, and is a funder/advisor in the field. The article is derived from his and Alex Koshykov’s interview for their podcast Digital Health Inside Out (48 minutes, go to YouTube, no paywall). “A no-holds-barred conversation about what’s broken in healthcare media, what’s about to break in digital health, and why she’s not coming back to journalism.”

Until next week….

Two weekend ‘must reads’: the New Yorker’s Sam Altman/OpenAI exposé–and comments; a further deep dive into Carbon Health’s implosion

Too long to summarize or opine on this week–but a must for your weekend reading. Grab the cuppa for the talk of AI World–a New Yorker dissection of Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI (link below). To say it is an exposé worthy, at first glance, of the Old School (ain’t no school like the Old School–Ed.) on probably the most important company of AD 2026 is to undersell it. It’s a long article and you’ll need at least one break.

OpenAI, founded as a non-profit with integrity at its core to “prioritize the safety of humanity over the company’s success, or even its survival”, recapitalized last year as a for-profit corporation with 26% of the shares owned by the OpenAI Foundation. It is now a trillion-dollar company that had no trouble raising a paltry $122 billion last week [TTA 2 April] though arguments are made that at least some of that money are IOUs or contingent. ChatGPT has become almost generic for AI, like Kleenex has become for tissues. The battles over control and direction of the company are now totally controlled by Sam Altman, whom former colleagues are not shy about pointing out his difficulty with the truth and a pattern of deceit, for instance to his board, to employees, and Microsoft. Yet everyone continues to do business with him. The FOMO Factor is very strong.

Mr. Altman makes extremely broad statements on the future of work (most traditional managerial, healthcare, and IT jobs will be taken over by AI, thus most of us will be unemployed), has easy access to President Donald Trump, as well as other world executives, and may, as the headline barks, control our future. Thus, he is a person of consequence.

My read so far of this is that within OpenAI, there is no one to counterbalance Mr. Altman’s immense ambition, his desire to dominate and win, not only with AI but also over all business and everyday life. These are character issues that also show up in aspects of his personal life, detailed in the article. If past results are predictive of the future, this flaw usually curdles into the desire to control countries and a complete disrespect for the rest of us leading our lives. 

Sam Altman May Control Our Future–Can He Be Trusted?, 

I will offer two LinkedIn comment posts on this article from an AI person I respect, the head of Curiouser.ai, Stephen Klein. Many of his posts on LinkedIn deal with what AI can and cannot do in business. He writes that he is “committed to designing technology that augments people, creates jobs, and elevates humanity. It’s time we all got back to thinking for ourselves.” 7 April, 8 April 

Our second Must Read is from Sergei Polevikov’s AI Health Uncut, a long analysis on the failure of Carbon Health and what it tells us in “this business we have chosen”. “What The Hell Went Wrong?” and its implications need answers–because it’s being repeated again and again. Today’s article (9 April) is Part 1 of 2, sets the stage about the mistakes made (insiders talk) and, with full credit, springboards off Stuart Miller’s (Haverin Consulting) original analysis made at the time of the Chapter 11 reorg. What we called the ‘Ominous Parallels’ was a Must Read here on 12 February.  TTA (as Telecare Aware, our original name) and this article are also mentioned twice (thanks!).

Those who have yet to subscribe for Mr. Polevikov’s analytic, erudite, and revealing (Emperor’s New Clothes!) POVs can read part of this article for free–but seriously, if you’re in this business, the subscription is worth your money. He also podcasts (links are on his Substack, link at lower right sidebar).

An early and scandalous publisher (before he utterly lost it), Matt Drudge, used to say that he ‘went where the stink is’. Mr. Polevikov does the same. The stink is of our broken primary care reimbursement system, the Covid steroids that pumped up the company, flailing management running through money like drugs, and good ideas for patient care buried under incompetence. 

This week’s Must Read: a deep dive on football’s Tom Brady’s involvement with GLP-1 e-Rx eMed

For your reading before the NFL Conference championships on Sunday–when celebrity and phenomenal ability don’t necessarily translate to sound judgment. Sergei Polevikov’s latest dissection of Shady Digital Health Doings in AI Health Uncut focuses on Patriots’ quarterback great Tom Brady’s splashy deal with GLP-1 telehealth prescriber/reseller eMed.–then segues to eMed’s story. Brady was named chief wellness officer of the company last Monday. His job with them? “To raise awareness of a more accountable approach for employers to offer medically supervised population health benefits, including GLP-1 therapies, emphasizing the importance of eMed’s medical oversight and its ability to drive long-term health outcomes.” Qualifications? Brady was famous for his TB12 rigorous training and diet regimen, which extended his career to age 45, about 10-15 years longer than most players. He has zero medical background. 

Mr. Polevikov’s narrative documents Brady’s hands-on (so to speak) involvement with a 2014 football championship scandal (“Deflategate”), then his $30 million spokesman engagement with FTX, Sam Bankman-Fried’s crypto-currency exchange that spectacularly imploded in 2022. For a quarterback whose fame hinged on excellent judgment, except in returning to football after his first retirement, he (and other celebrities) didn’t do the due diligence. But eMed is a step further for Brady. He is more than an eMed endorser–he has an actual company title and an attributed function. Certainly, Brady did not come inexpensively for this relatively young company, funded most recently by Aon Investment for an undisclosed amount.

Background–and interesting intersections. eMed was founded in 2020 by investor Michael Ferro. It started with 2020’s hot product–pandemic Covid-19 tests with online reporting at $35. In 2023, they pivoted into GLP-1 e-prescribing and blood testing. Ferro also founded in-store health kiosk Higi in 2012, though departing management by 2016. Higi was sold to Ali Parsa’s Babylon Health after their spectacular SPAC in late 2021. This would not be the last time Ferro’s and Parsa’s paths would cross, as after Babylon’s Chapter 7 (US) and administration (UK), eMed bought the remains of Babylon Health UK while GP at hand stayed with a group of central London GPs and the NHS. Like the US, the UK operation markets GLP-1 meds to men and women on separate websites (HeMed and SheMed). The US sells both injectable GLP-1s and the new Wegovy oral semaglutide pill.

The rest of the article opens up eMed’s hood, looking at Michael Ferro’s background, some of his hires including Linda Yaccarino (ex-X), Dr. Patrice A. Harris (founder), and (under the chassis) Charlie Javice (a de facto CEO now facing seven years in Club Fed for defrauding JP Morgan with the sale of her company, Frank), and the parts that don’t quite work, such as its financials (allegedly burning through cash) and lack of patient outcomes on GLP-1 meds.

Part of the article is posted on LinkedIn. The article is also on AI Health Uncut on Substack, but a full read requires a modest subscription. It is definitely worth it. Sergei Polevikov is also the host of a podcast, Digital Health Inside Out (free on YouTube), recently interviewing Halle Tecco on what is really broken in healthcare, with a preview of her book ‘Massively Better Healthcare’ (out in February).

Weekend reading/viewing (for me too): Rural telehealth blackouts and value-based care’s ‘utopia’

Your Editor recommends grabbing lunch or a cuppa for these lengthy reads/views:

Flawed Federal Programs Maroon Rural Americans in Telehealth Blackouts. This is mostly about the billions spent in ‘last mile’ programs since the Clinton Administration (!) through the first Trump Administration that were supposed to subsidize better internet connectivity to the un- and poorly connected in US rural areas. This Editor has written about both the FCC Rural Health Program, state programs funded by Covid money, and more pilots going back a decade that never seemed to culminate in success. The programs were makeshift and while some have worked, have left nearly 3 million other rural Americans, young and old, in “dead zones” where even where there is connectivity, there’s not enough bandwidth for telehealth. It focuses on about one-third of West Virginia: 14 counties where high-speed internet deserts overlap with health care provider shortages. Warning, mildly ax-grinding political. Published in the Daily Yonder from KFF Health News.

Value-Based Care: Sluggish Adoption or an Unrealistic Utopia? This panel discussion up on YouTube hosted by Alex Koshykov brings together Sergei Polevikov (AI Health Uncut, see sidebar), Arvind R. Cavale (Clinical Endocrinologist, Diabetes & Endocrinology Consultants of Pennsylvania, LLC), Sally Lewis (Swansea University Professor Value in Health Management), and Mendel Erlenwein (Founder and CEO of CareCo) to discuss what the infamous VBC is really (again) all it’s cracked up to be. It’s supposed to be all about the outcomes, but when was the last time a patient walked in and asked for ‘value’? Having played in the ACO world where the mantra was VBC all the time, like ACOs what it meant went from three supports to four and in the view of whomever you were speaking with. 1 hour 20 minutes.

Weekend reading: 23andMe updates, a view at variance from the former co-founder, and a deeper historical analysis

23andMe passes the ‘First Day Motions’ test in Federal bankruptcy court. On Wednesday, 23andMe received permission from the court to, during their Chapter 11:

  • Pay employee wages and benefits
  • Compensate certain vendors and suppliers in the ordinary course of business for goods and services
  • Enter into the term sheet of the $35 million debtor-in-possession financing agreement (DIP Facility) with JMB Capital Partners
  • Begin the process of selling substantially all of its assets* through a Chapter 11 plan or pursuant to Section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code.

The court also approved the bidding procedures that take place over the 45-day clock that started with the bankruptcy petition on 23 March. Bidding is conducted by the company and Moelis, their independent investment banker.

  • Qualified bids must agree to comply with 23andMe’s consumer privacy policy and laws regarding treatment of customer data.
  • Any sale transaction involving the transfer of customer data requires court oversight and regulatory approvals.

Additional first day orders on the Kroll (claims agent) website are the retention of two law firms, Goodwin Procter LLP and Lewis Rice LLP by the Special Committee of the board of directors, and the continued use of cash management systems, intercompany transactions, honoring certain prepetition obligations, and priority on administrative expense to postpetition intercompany claims against debtors.

The next step is the ‘Second Day’ hearing that follows up on financing, with the entry of an order approving the DIP Facility and ‘additional requested relief’ that isn’t specified in the 23andMe release. 

*Given that thousands, perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands of a reported 14 million users, are deleting as much data as they can from the 23andMe database, what will the value of that genetic database be? Regarding that database, will there be a third-party ‘guard’ on that database appointed by the Court?

The TTA summary of the bankruptcy 24-26 March  This Editor likened the 23andMe implosion to that of Theranos–a watershed event that forces a rethinking of how we treat the privacy of customer medical data not covered by HIPAA, such as genetic data, as we approach (or try to approach) the mountain called ‘personalized medicine’.

23andMe’s co-founder, Linda Avey, essayed in LinkedIn yesterday that 23andMe was a missed opportunity to create a grand genomic dataset that would combine blood work, deeper gene sequencing, and wearable date culminating into actionable insights. The data is now fragmented among many holders.  In her conclusion, she was polite but unsparing: “Without continued consumer-focused product development, and without proper governance, 23andMe lost its way, and society missed a key opportunity in furthering the idea of personalized health. The 14+ million people who bought into the concept deserve to see their data moved to a secure platform with new leadership and vision. Consumers, however, should be careful sharing their data if they don’t trust its secure and ethical use”.Ms. Avey, a scientist and venture investor, was forced out of the company in 2009.

23andMe’s failure is more significant than Theranos as an example of reality versus the hype. Theranos was a near-straight up fraud with blood labs that didn’t work. 23andMe had a technology that worked and could with accuracy your ancestry and genetic risk factors, though the latter got them into trouble with the FDA with a cease-and-desist in 2013 [TTA 2 April 2014] that they didn’t emerge from till late 2015. But ancestry and genetic risk are ‘one and done’ readings. It’s not an ongoing business model. How do you get members to return and pay for more tests, even if they lose money? How do you get investors? Pivot to research and ‘therapeutic development’. The reality, as Anne Wojcicki herself admitted, is that there’s no money in diagnosis and prevention. “No one makes money in healthcare by keeping you healthy” and  “There’s no profit motive for people to get this information. A doctor does not make money if they give a diagnostic”–and this was said by her in 2019.

So how did the company become valued at $6 billion by 2021? Work the story, work the hype around preventative healthcare to get more venture rounds and then a SPAC facilitated IPO. “Personalized healthcare”.  A “research platform powered by engaged customers”.  While the real money was in selling the data to Pfizer, Genentech, and GSK–and that started back in 2015. All couched in ‘personalized healthcare’ and research.

Far, far more on this is over at AI Health Uncut, Sergei Polevikov’s Substack site. Grab your cuppa and/or lunch. It has more financial facts, particularly around 23andMe’s early years, and the botched opportunity of the Lemonaid acquisition. Everyone is a loser when it comes to 23andMe, except the Lemonaid founders who walked away with $100 million in cash (but lost $300 million in stock). It comes to the sad and numerically relentless conclusion that 23andMe was actually bankrupt since 2018. It was chasing ‘an impossible dream’ and was dishonest about its business model. The end result was that public trust in health tech erodes again–and that investors and founders trust each other a lot less. (And Mr. Polevikov also dubbed 23andMe another Theranos.)

Editor’s note: AI Health Uncut may be paywalled. I encourage our Readers to support Sergei’s work on Substack–for a modest annual subscription amount, you gain full access to his work, past and present, charts, videos, and articles.

Two Must Reads: What’s Glen Tullman’s real game with Transcarent and the Accolade buy? (updated) Plus an extra helping on the VC ‘mafia’ and Hippocratic AI.

Make some time over the morning cuppa or lunch for a brilliant investigative report on Transcarent and Glen Tullman. Arundhati Parmar over at MedCity News pulls aside some of those Great Oz curtains, surveys the scene, then asks the questions that few have dared to. Such as:

  • Is Transcarent’s model not working? Are they successful or not?
  • Or are those corporations and benefits consultants so hidebound, so powerful, so exclusive, that they forced Glen Tullman to buy into the traditional care navigation model–and he is a Victim of the System?

Those of us in the healthtech/digital health industry have looked with amazement, mixed with dismay, at Mr. Tullman. The amazement is the powerful voice he has among us, reinforced by his investment funds. The dismay comes from the $18 billion sale of Livongo to Teladoc in the palmy days of 2020. As we reported, even then it was regarded as a dubious move. It then became a case study in What Not To Buy–Or Do. From Mr. Tullman’s and his management’s perspective, Teladoc’s offer proved to be Grand Theft Auto. In other words, a heist to end all heists. For Teladoc, it was a disaster. Mr. Gorevic, as we know, is gone and Teladoc is rebuilding. In many ways, Teladoc has never recovered and may never. 

Mr. Tullman, who founded two VCs, 7wireVentures and most recently 62 Ventures, after selling Livongo almost at once founded Transcarent with a vision that it would do the job through software that human corporate care navigators and benefits consultants couldn’t do–take out all these middlemen and deliver to both companies and their employees better quality healthcare at a much lower cost. It would also turn the PMPM (per member per month) pricing scheme into a risk-sharing model based on use. He made the rounds at every conference pitching against traditional care navigators, including the most prominent, Accolade.

Last month, he and Transcarent made a substantial offer to buy, yes, Accolade, for $621 million [TTA 8 Jan]. Publicly traded and struggling for years, recently losing major accounts, Accolade was on the block–yet its model is so different than Transcarent’s that it feels like double vision. In fact, this deal had been in the works since last July–initiated by Glen Tullman. Why?

A clue from one of Ms. Parmar’s sources, most of whom have had to be anonymous for obvious reasons:

“He is an amazing storyteller and amateur magician. But like any story and magic trick, sometimes it’s hard to tell what is real and the trick doesn’t work. ”

Ms. Parmar’s path to answering these questions is top notch, and this Editor invites you to read it, start to finish–and return to it again. When you finish it, you’ll not only know about Transcarent’s current business realities, but also learn a great deal about how companies regard care navigation plus the economics. The discrepancy, as always, is between the ‘vision’ and reality. Is he in it for the mission, or has reality bitten? Is Glen Tullman a Hypocrite or a Victim of the System He Aimed to Disrupt? (I also want to commend MedCity News for publishing this)

Update: See Ms. Parmar’s video on LinkedIn regarding the response to her article. Of note: 1) the complete lack of response from Transcarent’s corporate communications team*. 2) If you want investigative journalism, you have to be willing to be a source, so when you see something wrong, you have to reach out. That means risk. (*No surprise to this Editor, who directly contacted Transcarent’s corporate comms team to clarify whether 98point6’s telehealth service, purchased for $100 million, still was operating–no reply to this simple ‘layup’. TTA 5 Feb)

Our ‘extra of the day’ is from AI Health Uncut. Sergei Polevikov, publishing on Substack, puts on the scuba gear and dives deep not only into Hippocratic AI, which promotes AI agents for various types of healthcare contact requirements, but also its key funder, General Catalyst and its head, Hemant Taneja. For starters: Hippocratic AI is the most expensive AI company on Planet Earth if viewed as valuation x revenue multiple. Mr. P brings the numbers and the heat.

If you’ve looked at fundings in the past two years, versus the ‘olden days’, and wonder why the same names always seem to pop up, it is because VC fundings have become concentrated among very few companies. As this Editor noted in the Rock Health 2024 results, of 391 VC funds, 30 raised 75% of all US committed capital. Nine of those funds accounted for 50% (Pitchbook). Sitting at or near the top is General Catalyst, which has moved into wealth management and through HATco, owning hospitals such as Summa Health. But there are other reasons as well, and Mr. Polevikov gets into the murk.  It’s another one for a long cuppa or lunch. And it is part one of two, upcoming!

I encourage our Readers to support Sergei’s work on Substack–for a modest annual subscription amount, you gain full access to his work, past and present, charts, videos, and articles. (I did, and have noted his site among Websites We Like.) The link above may be paywalled as a result for non-subscribers. [Disclaimer: through commenting in this article, I pointed out GC’s move into GC Wealth, and my short news item is linked.] He also recently posted a lively panel discussion video with Alex Koshykov, Matthew Holt, and James Wang.  

2025 is proving to be a year of massive change in healthcare. It may be a year of comeuppance for those we’ve regarded as all powerful and fearsome. Yes, the cliché ‘sunshine is the best disinfectant’ is true, but a good dose of hydrogen peroxide, boric acid, or Lysol helps.