23andMe passes the ‘First Day Motions’ test in Federal bankruptcy court. On Wednesday, 23andMe received permission from the court to, during their Chapter 11:
- Pay employee wages and benefits
- Compensate certain vendors and suppliers in the ordinary course of business for goods and services
- Enter into the term sheet of the $35 million debtor-in-possession financing agreement (DIP Facility) with JMB Capital Partners
- Begin the process of selling substantially all of its assets* through a Chapter 11 plan or pursuant to Section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code.
The court also approved the bidding procedures that take place over the 45-day clock that started with the bankruptcy petition on 23 March. Bidding is conducted by the company and Moelis, their independent investment banker.
- Qualified bids must agree to comply with 23andMe’s consumer privacy policy and laws regarding treatment of customer data.
- Any sale transaction involving the transfer of customer data requires court oversight and regulatory approvals.
Additional first day orders on the Kroll (claims agent) website are the retention of two law firms, Goodwin Procter LLP and Lewis Rice LLP by the Special Committee of the board of directors, and the continued use of cash management systems, intercompany transactions, honoring certain prepetition obligations, and priority on administrative expense to postpetition intercompany claims against debtors.
The next step is the ‘Second Day’ hearing that follows up on financing, with the entry of an order approving the DIP Facility and ‘additional requested relief’ that isn’t specified in the 23andMe release.
*Given that thousands, perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands of a reported 14 million users, are deleting as much data as they can from the 23andMe database, what will the value of that genetic database be? Regarding that database, will there be a third-party ‘guard’ on that database appointed by the Court?
The TTA summary of the bankruptcy 24-26 March This Editor likened the 23andMe implosion to that of Theranos–a watershed event that forces a rethinking of how we treat the privacy of customer medical data not covered by HIPAA, such as genetic data, as we approach (or try to approach) the mountain called ‘personalized medicine’.
23andMe’s co-founder, Linda Avey, essayed in LinkedIn yesterday that 23andMe was a missed opportunity to create a grand genomic dataset that would combine blood work, deeper gene sequencing, and wearable date culminating into actionable insights. The data is now fragmented among many holders. In her conclusion, she was polite but unsparing: “Without continued consumer-focused product development, and without proper governance, 23andMe lost its way, and society missed a key opportunity in furthering the idea of personalized health. The 14+ million people who bought into the concept deserve to see their data moved to a secure platform with new leadership and vision. Consumers, however, should be careful sharing their data if they don’t trust its secure and ethical use”.Ms. Avey, a scientist and venture investor, was forced out of the company in 2009.
23andMe’s failure is more significant than Theranos as an example of reality versus the hype. Theranos was a near-straight up fraud with blood labs that didn’t work. 23andMe had a technology that worked and could with accuracy your ancestry and genetic risk factors, though the latter got them into trouble with the FDA with a cease-and-desist in 2013 [TTA 2 April 2014] that they didn’t emerge from till late 2015. But ancestry and genetic risk are ‘one and done’ readings. It’s not an ongoing business model. How do you get members to return and pay for more tests, even if they lose money? How do you get investors? Pivot to research and ‘therapeutic development’. The reality, as Anne Wojcicki herself admitted, is that there’s no money in diagnosis and prevention. “No one makes money in healthcare by keeping you healthy” and “There’s no profit motive for people to get this information. A doctor does not make money if they give a diagnostic”–and this was said by her in 2019.
So how did the company become valued at $6 billion by 2021? Work the story, work the hype around preventative healthcare to get more venture rounds and then a SPAC facilitated IPO. “Personalized healthcare”. A “research platform powered by engaged customers”. While the real money was in selling the data to Pfizer, Genentech, and GSK–and that started back in 2015. All couched in ‘personalized healthcare’ and research.
Far, far more on this is over at AI Health Uncut, Sergei Polevikov’s Substack site. Grab your cuppa and/or lunch. It has more financial facts, particularly around 23andMe’s early years, and the botched opportunity of the Lemonaid acquisition. Everyone is a loser when it comes to 23andMe, except the Lemonaid founders who walked away with $100 million in cash (but lost $300 million in stock). It comes to the sad and numerically relentless conclusion that 23andMe was actually bankrupt since 2018. It was chasing ‘an impossible dream’ and was dishonest about its business model. The end result was that public trust in health tech erodes again–and that investors and founders trust each other a lot less. (And Mr. Polevikov also dubbed 23andMe another Theranos.)
Editor’s note: AI Health Uncut may be paywalled. I encourage our Readers to support Sergei’s work on Substack–for a modest annual subscription amount, you gain full access to his work, past and present, charts, videos, and articles.
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