The other shoe drops, as UnitedHealth Group/Optum take their defense public a day later. This unorthodox approach to defending an acquisition against a Department of Justice lawsuit [TTA 13 Nov] is visible on a specially set up Optum page. ImprovingHomeCare.com predictably highlights the benefits of an Amedisys merger along with the divestitures to VitalCaring Group. The gauntlet thrown is unadorned: “The Amedisys combination with Optum would be pro-competitive and further innovation, leading to improved patient outcomes and greater access to quality care. We will vigorously defend against the Department of Justice’s overreaching interpretation of the antitrust laws.”
- Setup is around present and future demand–and that providers have to be capable of investing and scaling to meet it. “70% of adults 65 or older will likely need some form of long-term care during their lives.” and 3 million Americans received home health services in 2020 (Editor’s note–in a pandemic year when visits were certainly curtailed).
- Home health is highly fragmented both nationally and locally, thus the acquisition isn’t anti-competitive. “In metropolitan areas with approximately 500,000 residents, there are an average of 26 agencies serving the metro area. The combination of Optum and Amedisys would be a fraction of both home health and hospice–and there would be strong competition in both metro and rural areas.
- The divestiture to VitalCaring would further preserve competition, and that VitalCaring is a quality competitor. The DOJ release made much of VitalCaring’s inadequacies, such as their lower quality scores, financial difficulties, and leadership. VitalCaring, headquartered in Austin, Texas, currently operates in six states with 58 locations with plans to expand. Their CEO April Anthony is cited as building multiple home health companies ‘from scratch’ such as Encompass Care.
- Additional proof points stress streamlining of care across Optum’s areas of expertise, integrating technology, and improving value-based care coordination.
Forward’s shut down continues to reverberate in a classic tale of overreach and misdirection. Their bet on kiosks, plus a ‘forward-tech’ approach to a concierge-on-the-cheap, no- insurance-accepted model of primary care over eight years, apparently led to what pilots call a death spiral–it begins wide and imperceptible until it tightens and accelerates fatally in a final dive. Business Insider, true to its name, spoke with 11 anonymous and now former employees who attributed the failure to putting all their chips on 3,200 CarePods installed in one year. Their CEO, Adrian Aoun, was obsessed with technology to the point where he wanted to replace his offices and doctors with CarePods and started to strip the clinics of services, despite only two CarePods installed.
Most advanced, yet unacceptable*. Patients didn’t try out or use the CarePods, finding them less than inviting. Logistical challenges delayed placements in large markets like New York and Chicago. Then technical problems mounted: automated blood draws failed, lab tests were withdrawn. The coup de grace–patients kept getting trapped in the CarePods. They were insanely expensive–the first two CarePods cost over $1 million each. Then the huge units were unattractive to landlords who didn’t want to fight local building codes nor saw a profit in them. By the end of the summer, there were only two CarePods in place at a mall in Sacramento and in Chandler, Arizona, both gathering dust. (*Shout out to Raymond Loewy, Never Leave Well Enough Alone)
In the increasingly empty Forward clinic offices, the futuristic tech and breadth of services touted in social media adverts weren’t quite as advertised. The whole-body scanner glitched requiring manual checks. Their lab tests became limited to those that could be done in-house, eliminating genetic testing via 23andMe along with services such as simple dermatology removals.
Christina Farr in Second Opinion has a set of takeaways worth noting, with this Editor’s comments (in parentheses):
- Subscription-based, out-of-pocket healthcare is possible–but hard. (WAY hard when basics are up 25%+! And insurance is almost a given, even if taken in part.)
- Brick-and-mortar clinics make only limited sense–and space must be used economically, not easy to do in health tech. (Retail and in-person are perhaps anathema in the concepts of those in health tech.)
- We’re not focusing on those who really need care (But they’re not sexy, wealthy, or relatable to the creators of said tech. Many of them are also on Medicare and Medicaid–truly not sexy.)
- Primary care is a tough starting point for subscription care (Except the very highest, most exclusive end as she notes!) Specialties may be more amenable to this model. (But volume?) And different age groups want different relationships within this type of care.
- Timing is everything. Perhaps if Forward had started its clinics today it would have had a far better chance of success? (Then look at bullets 1-4 and see how truly daunting a tech-first clinic setup can be for the tech mindset untempered by research and UX-minded marketing.)
Forward is yet another sad and expensive example of 1) a founder hyperfocusing on whiz-bang technology, 2) losing touch with the customers using it, 3) not improving delivery based on customer needs, and 4) forgetting where he ostensibly started–the mission of improving healthcare. This Editor is sure that his 30-odd investors, especially Vinod Khosla, will have something to say to him about running through $100 million in one year–and over $300 million over eight years.
Masimo’s now-former CEO booted from his company and sued–to boot! (updated) The new management formally terminated founder Joe Kiani on 24 October, as noted in an October SEC filing. In a classic ‘you’re fired..no, I quit!’ situation, after he lost the proxy fight for control of the company, he resigned on 19 September. Kiani immediately filed a lawsuit against Masimo in California state court to obtain a $400 million payout per his employment contract. It is reported to be a declaratory relief suit that hinges on a ‘resignation for good reason’. This is usually specified in the contract. An example is that the executive ceases to be part of senior management, along with others.
The new board of directors has now turned the tables. Masimo is now suing Kiani and RTW Investments in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York. The complaint alleges collusion to violate Federal securities laws by secretly manipulating the shareholder vote through an ’empty voting’ scheme. Empty voting is done through put options or by selling the shares after the record date but before the shareholder meeting. It’s a way for an investor to build up share control and sway the outcome of a shareholder vote at little cost. The suit proposes that Kiani and RTW did precisely that, rigging the vote by acquiring control of over 19% of shares. Evidently, the BOD has proof. The lawsuit and more details are in Strata-gee.
(Editor’s opinion: this is a bare-knucks attempt to claw back Kiani’s contract payout by the new controlling company, Politan Capital Management. And both lawsuits could be true. Pass the popcorn.)
Insult upon injury for Joe Kiani is that shareholders now have some hope that management can save the company by concentrating on healthcare tech. Shares are up. Masimo’s Q3 results reported on 5 November were strong though net income declined. Sound United, the main anchor dragging down the company, is now termed ‘a discontinued operation’. Exhaustive detail on their results is in Strata-gee here.
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