This week’s Must Read: a deep dive on football’s Tom Brady’s involvement with GLP-1 e-Rx eMed

For your reading before the NFL Conference championships on Sunday–when celebrity and phenomenal ability don’t necessarily translate to sound judgment. Sergei Polevikov’s latest dissection of Shady Digital Health Doings in AI Health Uncut focuses on Patriots’ quarterback great Tom Brady’s splashy deal with GLP-1 telehealth prescriber/reseller eMed.–then segues to eMed’s story. Brady was named chief wellness officer of the company last Monday. His job with them? “To raise awareness of a more accountable approach for employers to offer medically supervised population health benefits, including GLP-1 therapies, emphasizing the importance of eMed’s medical oversight and its ability to drive long-term health outcomes.” Qualifications? Brady was famous for his TB12 rigorous training and diet regimen, which extended his career to age 45, about 10-15 years longer than most players. He has zero medical background. 

Mr. Polevikov’s narrative documents Brady’s hands-on (so to speak) involvement with a 2014 football championship scandal (“Deflategate”), then his $30 million spokesman engagement with FTX, Sam Bankman-Fried’s crypto-currency exchange that spectacularly imploded in 2022. For a quarterback whose fame hinged on excellent judgment, except in returning to football after his first retirement, he (and other celebrities) didn’t do the due diligence. But eMed is a step further for Brady. He is more than an eMed endorser–he has an actual company title and an attributed function. Certainly, Brady did not come inexpensively for this relatively young company, funded most recently by Aon Investment for an undisclosed amount.

Background–and interesting intersections. eMed was founded in 2020 by investor Michael Ferro. It started with 2020’s hot product–pandemic Covid-19 tests with online reporting at $35. In 2023, they pivoted into GLP-1 e-prescribing and blood testing. Ferro also founded in-store health kiosk Higi in 2012, though departing management by 2016. Higi was sold to Ali Parsa’s Babylon Health after their spectacular SPAC in late 2021. This would not be the last time Ferro’s and Parsa’s paths would cross, as after Babylon’s Chapter 7 (US) and administration (UK), eMed bought the remains of Babylon Health UK while GP at hand stayed with a group of central London GPs and the NHS. Like the US, the UK operation markets GLP-1 meds to men and women on separate websites (HeMed and SheMed). The US sells both injectable GLP-1s and the new Wegovy oral semaglutide pill.

The rest of the article opens up eMed’s hood, looking at Michael Ferro’s background, some of his hires including Linda Yaccarino (ex-X), Dr. Patrice A. Harris (founder), and (under the chassis) Charlie Javice (a de facto CEO now facing seven years in Club Fed for defrauding JP Morgan with the sale of her company, Frank), and the parts that don’t quite work, such as its financials (allegedly burning through cash) and lack of patient outcomes on GLP-1 meds.

Part of the article is posted on LinkedIn. The article is also on AI Health Uncut on Substack, but a full read requires a modest subscription. It is definitely worth it. Sergei Polevikov is also the host of a podcast, Digital Health Inside Out (free on YouTube), recently interviewing Halle Tecco on what is really broken in healthcare, with a preview of her book ‘Massively Better Healthcare’ (out in February).

Weekend reading/viewing (for me too): Rural telehealth blackouts and value-based care’s ‘utopia’

Your Editor recommends grabbing lunch or a cuppa for these lengthy reads/views:

Flawed Federal Programs Maroon Rural Americans in Telehealth Blackouts. This is mostly about the billions spent in ‘last mile’ programs since the Clinton Administration (!) through the first Trump Administration that were supposed to subsidize better internet connectivity to the un- and poorly connected in US rural areas. This Editor has written about both the FCC Rural Health Program, state programs funded by Covid money, and more pilots going back a decade that never seemed to culminate in success. The programs were makeshift and while some have worked, have left nearly 3 million other rural Americans, young and old, in “dead zones” where even where there is connectivity, there’s not enough bandwidth for telehealth. It focuses on about one-third of West Virginia: 14 counties where high-speed internet deserts overlap with health care provider shortages. Warning, mildly ax-grinding political. Published in the Daily Yonder from KFF Health News.

Value-Based Care: Sluggish Adoption or an Unrealistic Utopia? This panel discussion up on YouTube hosted by Alex Koshykov brings together Sergei Polevikov (AI Health Uncut, see sidebar), Arvind R. Cavale (Clinical Endocrinologist, Diabetes & Endocrinology Consultants of Pennsylvania, LLC), Sally Lewis (Swansea University Professor Value in Health Management), and Mendel Erlenwein (Founder and CEO of CareCo) to discuss what the infamous VBC is really (again) all it’s cracked up to be. It’s supposed to be all about the outcomes, but when was the last time a patient walked in and asked for ‘value’? Having played in the ACO world where the mantra was VBC all the time, like ACOs what it meant went from three supports to four and in the view of whomever you were speaking with. 1 hour 20 minutes.

Are Hippocratic AI and AI “nurses” the wave of the future–or just another tide of hype? Two articles question.

Gimlet EyeTwo Gimlety views of a hot AI player, Hippocratic AI. 2025’s first $1.6 billion valuation unicorn after its January $141 million Series B venture round is on a hiring streak. Their ‘safety focused generative AI for healthcare’ built on large language models (LLMs) has developed multi-age, ethnicity, and language AI-powered virtual “nurses” to interact with patients on post-discharge follow ups for medical and hospital visits, chronic care management, and medication reminders. The purpose of the agentic AI nurses is to close the gap of healthcare staff shortages.

On their website, the recorded demos of the ‘nurses’ roleplaying with real nurses sounded to this Editor responsive, warm, convincing, and uncannily human–the opposite of AI agents this Editor has dealt with, which are robotic, clearly on narrow scripts, and easily thrown off by off-script or critical questions, resulting in long silences and cutoffs. But none of the ‘patients’ threw curveballs, talked about multiple conditions, or deviated much in the Q and A. In other words, the bots got to shine.

Last month, it released its Polaris 3.0 product which organizes 22 LLMs having 4.2 trillion parameters, using proprietary data, documentation, regulatory documents and other training materials then tested by clinicians. It claims a clinical accuracy rate of 99.38% compared to 98.75% for their previous Polaris 2.0 version and upgrades in audio processing, agent emotional quotient, and improved clinical documentation. At the end of the month, Hippocratic AI announced seven new hires at C and VP levels, coming from major companies like Amwell, Blue Shield of California, non-profits such as Population Services International, and smaller healthcare companies such as Sidekick Health and Notable. Quite a move for a company only formed in February 2023, 22 months ago.  Release, Mobihealthnews

Hippocratic AI is on a roll, but as with any sudden rise and particularly with LLM AI, the technology and claims are being examined closely. Two articles on Substack take a critical view–this Editor strongly suggests getting a cuppa and taking time to read them carefully.

The shorter of the two (and open to all) is Thomas W. Dinsmore’s “No Bots, Please” . He looks at Hippocratic AI’s tech from the perspective of someone highly experienced in machine learning tools and platforms from back when we called them algorithms. He presents a lot of cautions and yellow flags.

  • Testing apparently not done on real patients
  • Their claims of Polaris’ accuracy are not benchmarked externally. “Independent benchmarks are impossible with a proprietary model like Polaris.”
  • LLMs are ubiquitous, costs are coming down, and investing in a company with proprietary LLMs may not be the smartest move.
  • Hippocratic AI has many healthcare ‘partners’ (this Editor counted 15), many glowing endorsements from healthcare leaders, an impressive timeline. The rub? They are likely not paying anything, which is unusual for a Series B anything much less a unicorn. (I can personally confirm this last point.) Everyone will say nice things about you if you are free.
  • He points out two types of value creation in healthcare. The first is doing a routine or even highly skilled process faster and better. The second is creating an entirely new capability.
  • The touted healthcare shortage number is way overstated. The 15 million healthcare worker shortage cited by WHO and Hippocratic is global. The need in developing nations is primarily midwives, which can’t be done virtually. In the US, the number reported by the Bureau of Health Workforce (BHW) is closer to 2 million, with about 1 million nurses and the rest in LPNs, adult psychiatrists, family physicians, internists, and other clinicians.
  • The Hippocratic pitch is that their bots can replace nurses. The irony is that what the bots do best–patient education–isn’t being done by nurses, based on a McKinsey study on nursing workloads. The nurses’ biggest time suck is updating documentation, followed by hunting and gathering (everything from locating patients to finding equipment), and medication administration. None of which can be done by Hippocratic AI. 
  • Bots have very limited use with mentally ill patients — and negative for those in crisis.

Conclusion: The model is shaky. The effort in creating bots is wasted. What would be a lot more useful in healthcare would be a system that prioritizes, flags, and notifies staff of a patient deteriorating who needs a real human being to call.

Want more? The Really Long Read is Sergei Polevikov’s Hypocritical AI: $45/Hour Human Nurses Babysitting $9/Hour “AI Nurses” in AI Health Uncut. This may be only partially viewable by those who are not subscribers (and it’s worth the small amount). It is a very deep and critical dive into Hippocratic AI, if what it is selling is real (red flag–their releases contain a lot of numbers which aren’t verifiable), and VC hype. The main sections of the article:

  1. What exactly Hippocratic AI is selling, including poor workflow and EHR integration 
  2. What’s really under the hood of its “AI agents.”
  3. The reality behind “AI nurses”—and the human nurses tasked with babysitting them.
  4. Whether Hippocratic AI fine-tuned its models using confidential insurance or health data obtained from Health IQ.
  5. The toxic corporate culture, code of silence, and reliance on H-1B/O-1 visa “slavery.”

Plenty of references and comparisons. If you aren’t skeptical after the Dinsmore article, you will be after this. A must read.

Weekend reading: 23andMe updates, a view at variance from the former co-founder, and a deeper historical analysis

23andMe passes the ‘First Day Motions’ test in Federal bankruptcy court. On Wednesday, 23andMe received permission from the court to, during their Chapter 11:

  • Pay employee wages and benefits
  • Compensate certain vendors and suppliers in the ordinary course of business for goods and services
  • Enter into the term sheet of the $35 million debtor-in-possession financing agreement (DIP Facility) with JMB Capital Partners
  • Begin the process of selling substantially all of its assets* through a Chapter 11 plan or pursuant to Section 363 of the US Bankruptcy Code.

The court also approved the bidding procedures that take place over the 45-day clock that started with the bankruptcy petition on 23 March. Bidding is conducted by the company and Moelis, their independent investment banker.

  • Qualified bids must agree to comply with 23andMe’s consumer privacy policy and laws regarding treatment of customer data.
  • Any sale transaction involving the transfer of customer data requires court oversight and regulatory approvals.

Additional first day orders on the Kroll (claims agent) website are the retention of two law firms, Goodwin Procter LLP and Lewis Rice LLP by the Special Committee of the board of directors, and the continued use of cash management systems, intercompany transactions, honoring certain prepetition obligations, and priority on administrative expense to postpetition intercompany claims against debtors.

The next step is the ‘Second Day’ hearing that follows up on financing, with the entry of an order approving the DIP Facility and ‘additional requested relief’ that isn’t specified in the 23andMe release

*Given that thousands, perhaps tens or hundreds of thousands of a reported 14 million users, are deleting as much data as they can from the 23andMe database, what will the value of that genetic database be? Regarding that database, will there be a third-party ‘guard’ on that database appointed by the Court?

The TTA summary of the bankruptcy 24-26 March  This Editor likened the 23andMe implosion to that of Theranos–a watershed event that forces a rethinking of how we treat the privacy of customer medical data not covered by HIPAA, such as genetic data, as we approach (or try to approach) the mountain called ‘personalized medicine’.

23andMe’s co-founder, Linda Avey, essayed in LinkedIn yesterday that 23andMe was a missed opportunity to create a grand genomic dataset that would combine blood work, deeper gene sequencing, and wearable date culminating into actionable insights. The data is now fragmented among many holders.  In her conclusion, she was polite but unsparing: “Without continued consumer-focused product development, and without proper governance, 23andMe lost its way, and society missed a key opportunity in furthering the idea of personalized health. The 14+ million people who bought into the concept deserve to see their data moved to a secure platform with new leadership and vision. Consumers, however, should be careful sharing their data if they don’t trust its secure and ethical use”.Ms. Avey, a scientist and venture investor, was forced out of the company in 2009.

23andMe’s failure is more significant than Theranos as an example of reality versus the hype. Theranos was a near-straight up fraud with blood labs that didn’t work. 23andMe had a technology that worked and could with accuracy your ancestry and genetic risk factors, though the latter got them into trouble with the FDA with a cease-and-desist in 2013 [TTA 2 April 2014] that they didn’t emerge from till late 2015. But ancestry and genetic risk are ‘one and done’ readings. It’s not an ongoing business model. How do you get members to return and pay for more tests, even if they lose money? How do you get investors? Pivot to research and ‘therapeutic development’. The reality, as Anne Wojcicki herself admitted, is that there’s no money in diagnosis and prevention. “No one makes money in healthcare by keeping you healthy” and  “There’s no profit motive for people to get this information. A doctor does not make money if they give a diagnostic”–and this was said by her in 2019.

So how did the company become valued at $6 billion by 2021? Work the story, work the hype around preventative healthcare to get more venture rounds and then a SPAC facilitated IPO. “Personalized healthcare”.  A “research platform powered by engaged customers”.  While the real money was in selling the data to Pfizer, Genentech, and GSK–and that started back in 2015. All couched in ‘personalized healthcare’ and research.

Far, far more on this is over at AI Health Uncut, Sergei Polevikov’s Substack site. Grab your cuppa and/or lunch. It has more financial facts, particularly around 23andMe’s early years, and the botched opportunity of the Lemonaid acquisition. Everyone is a loser when it comes to 23andMe, except the Lemonaid founders who walked away with $100 million in cash (but lost $300 million in stock). It comes to the sad and numerically relentless conclusion that 23andMe was actually bankrupt since 2018. It was chasing ‘an impossible dream’ and was dishonest about its business model. The end result was that public trust in health tech erodes again–and that investors and founders trust each other a lot less. (And Mr. Polevikov also dubbed 23andMe another Theranos.)

Editor’s note: AI Health Uncut may be paywalled. I encourage our Readers to support Sergei’s work on Substack–for a modest annual subscription amount, you gain full access to his work, past and present, charts, videos, and articles.

Two Must Reads: What’s Glen Tullman’s real game with Transcarent and the Accolade buy? (updated) Plus an extra helping on the VC ‘mafia’ and Hippocratic AI.

Make some time over the morning cuppa or lunch for a brilliant investigative report on Transcarent and Glen Tullman. Arundhati Parmar over at MedCity News pulls aside some of those Great Oz curtains, surveys the scene, then asks the questions that few have dared to. Such as:

  • Is Transcarent’s model not working? Are they successful or not?
  • Or are those corporations and benefits consultants so hidebound, so powerful, so exclusive, that they forced Glen Tullman to buy into the traditional care navigation model–and he is a Victim of the System?

Those of us in the healthtech/digital health industry have looked with amazement, mixed with dismay, at Mr. Tullman. The amazement is the powerful voice he has among us, reinforced by his investment funds. The dismay comes from the $18 billion sale of Livongo to Teladoc in the palmy days of 2020. As we reported, even then it was regarded as a dubious move. It then became a case study in What Not To Buy–Or Do. From Mr. Tullman’s and his management’s perspective, Teladoc’s offer proved to be Grand Theft Auto. In other words, a heist to end all heists. For Teladoc, it was a disaster. Mr. Gorevic, as we know, is gone and Teladoc is rebuilding. In many ways, Teladoc has never recovered and may never. 

Mr. Tullman, who founded two VCs, 7wireVentures and most recently 62 Ventures, after selling Livongo almost at once founded Transcarent with a vision that it would do the job through software that human corporate care navigators and benefits consultants couldn’t do–take out all these middlemen and deliver to both companies and their employees better quality healthcare at a much lower cost. It would also turn the PMPM (per member per month) pricing scheme into a risk-sharing model based on use. He made the rounds at every conference pitching against traditional care navigators, including the most prominent, Accolade.

Last month, he and Transcarent made a substantial offer to buy, yes, Accolade, for $621 million [TTA 8 Jan]. Publicly traded and struggling for years, recently losing major accounts, Accolade was on the block–yet its model is so different than Transcarent’s that it feels like double vision. In fact, this deal had been in the works since last July–initiated by Glen Tullman. Why?

A clue from one of Ms. Parmar’s sources, most of whom have had to be anonymous for obvious reasons:

“He is an amazing storyteller and amateur magician. But like any story and magic trick, sometimes it’s hard to tell what is real and the trick doesn’t work. ”

Ms. Parmar’s path to answering these questions is top notch, and this Editor invites you to read it, start to finish–and return to it again. When you finish it, you’ll not only know about Transcarent’s current business realities, but also learn a great deal about how companies regard care navigation plus the economics. The discrepancy, as always, is between the ‘vision’ and reality. Is he in it for the mission, or has reality bitten? Is Glen Tullman a Hypocrite or a Victim of the System He Aimed to Disrupt? (I also want to commend MedCity News for publishing this)

Update: See Ms. Parmar’s video on LinkedIn regarding the response to her article. Of note: 1) the complete lack of response from Transcarent’s corporate communications team*. 2) If you want investigative journalism, you have to be willing to be a source, so when you see something wrong, you have to reach out. That means risk. (*No surprise to this Editor, who directly contacted Transcarent’s corporate comms team to clarify whether 98point6’s telehealth service, purchased for $100 million, still was operating–no reply to this simple ‘layup’. TTA 5 Feb)

Our ‘extra of the day’ is from AI Health Uncut. Sergei Polevikov, publishing on Substack, puts on the scuba gear and dives deep not only into Hippocratic AI, which promotes AI agents for various types of healthcare contact requirements, but also its key funder, General Catalyst and its head, Hemant Taneja. For starters: Hippocratic AI is the most expensive AI company on Planet Earth if viewed as valuation x revenue multiple. Mr. P brings the numbers and the heat.

If you’ve looked at fundings in the past two years, versus the ‘olden days’, and wonder why the same names always seem to pop up, it is because VC fundings have become concentrated among very few companies. As this Editor noted in the Rock Health 2024 results, of 391 VC funds, 30 raised 75% of all US committed capital. Nine of those funds accounted for 50% (Pitchbook). Sitting at or near the top is General Catalyst, which has moved into wealth management and through HATco, owning hospitals such as Summa Health. But there are other reasons as well, and Mr. Polevikov gets into the murk.  It’s another one for a long cuppa or lunch. And it is part one of two, upcoming!

I encourage our Readers to support Sergei’s work on Substack–for a modest annual subscription amount, you gain full access to his work, past and present, charts, videos, and articles. (I did, and have noted his site among Websites We Like.) The link above may be paywalled as a result for non-subscribers. [Disclaimer: through commenting in this article, I pointed out GC’s move into GC Wealth, and my short news item is linked.] He also recently posted a lively panel discussion video with Alex Koshykov, Matthew Holt, and James Wang.  

2025 is proving to be a year of massive change in healthcare. It may be a year of comeuppance for those we’ve regarded as all powerful and fearsome. Yes, the cliché ‘sunshine is the best disinfectant’ is true, but a good dose of hydrogen peroxide, boric acid, or Lysol helps.