News roundup: Cano Health gets 2nd NYSE delisting warning; Veradigm acquires Koha Health RCM, faces class-action lawsuit; Bright Health-Molina sale closes; Devoted Health’s $175M Series E (updated)

January 3, 2024 | by

Cano Health gets another billet-doux from the NYSE. Spoiling the confetti and champagne, tech-based primary care provider Cano Health was notified on 29 December that it faced delisting from the NYSE, this time not for the share price (which is above $1 at $5.23) but for its total market capitalization. The NYSE has a pesky rule (Section 802.01B) that a company’s total market capitalization must be above $50 million over a 30 trading-day period and its stockholders’ equity must be above $50 million. The timeline: Cano has 10 business days from the 29th to respond to the NYSE to state intent to cure the deficiencies, and 45 days from that time to submit a business plan to regain compliance within 18 months. If accepted, shares will continue to trade. In its release, Cano announced accelerating its ‘transformation plan’ to further cut costs, divesting operations and terminating underperforming affiliate operations to save approximately $290 million by the end of 2024, which includes the $65 million of previously planned cost reductions. They will also need to pay $30 million in pre-tax charges to resolve exiting leases and staff termination charges. Earlier in December, Cano appointed two independent directors, Patricia Ferrari and Carol Flaton, both with strengths in restructuring companies and their financials. It also established a three-person finance committee, to assist in trimming down the company and exploring a sale. Release

Veradigm buys Koha Health, which specializes in orthopedic/musculoskeletal (MSK) revenue cycle management (RCM). Acquisition cost and management transitions were not disclosed. The purchase of Koha adds to Veradigm’s RCM portfolio in ambulatory health. Koha, based in Merrimack, New Hampshire, was still owned and run by younger members of the founding family.  Veradigm is still working out over a year of trouble with its Nasdaq listing and has changed out its CEO and CFO recently [TTA 14 Dec]. Release. Also HIStalk 1/3/24   

Updated  Veradigm faces a shareholder class-action lawsuit on its share price. As is typical in these cases, there is a lead plaintiff (John M, Erwin) represented by a law firm (in this case Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP of San Diego) which is filed on behalf of a class, in this case individuals who bought shares between 26 February 2021 and 13 June 2023 and suffered losses. It charges Veradigm as well as certain of its current and former top executive officers with violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  This centers around Veradigm’s ongoing problems in stating its financials from Q3 2021 and overstating its earnings from there through 2023, negatively affecting the share price. The lawsuit was filed 22 November 2023 in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Robbins Geller is now seeking other plaintiffs to join in the suit. Release, Justia Dockets & Filings, Mobihealthnews

Wrapping up another continuing story, Bright Health closed the sale of its California plans to Molina Healthcare on New Year’s Day. With the proceeds, reduced to $425 million [TTA 20 Dec 23], Bright as predicted cleared what was owed on its credit facility with JP Morgan, reduced on Friday by $30 million to approximately $298 million. The remaining funds will go to their cash position ($90 million in unregulated cash plus approximately $155 million in excess cash surplus after reserving for expenses) and $110 million from escrow, and now on its sole continuing value-based primary care business, NeueHealth. Cash reserves do not include CMS Repayment Agreements which come due on or before 14 March 2025, sufficiently far in the future (?). No mention of repayments to their lender New Enterprise Associates (NEA) or the Texas Department of Insurance clawing back money owed out of its insolvent Texas plan. You have to hand it to Bright Health. They’ve managed to play multiple ends against the middle and tie masterful Gordian knots (pick your analogy) to stay alive until, they hope, 2025.  [TTA 5 Dec].  Release 29 Dec. Release 2 Jan   FierceHealthcare

Updated  And one more bright spot: $175 million raised by Devoted Health. Devoted is a combination of Medicare Advantage (MA) plans with in-house telehealth and in-home care delivered by Devoted Medical. The Series E was funded by a lead syndicate composed of The Space Between (TSB), Highbury Holdings, GIC, Stardust Equity, Maverick Ventures, and Fearless Ventures with an arms-length list of other participants. Devoted was started by two brothers, former athenahealth and government IT leaders Ed and Todd Park, CEO and executive chairman respectively. Devoted release, Becker’s. Fierce Healthcare, Mobihealthnews

What a difference a little over two years makes. At the time of their hefty $1.15 billion Series D, raised in the heady days of October 2021, they were considered one of the smaller, more specialized ‘insurtechs’ along with Alignment Health. Now they are walking tall in a field of damaged or expired payers: Bright Health, Oscar, and Clover among the survivors, and Friday Health Plans deceased. Devoted now states that its MA plans serve 140,000 members in 299 counties across 13 states, as of December 2023. Most impressively, 94% of their members in Star-eligible plans are in 4 to 5 Star plans. Their HMO plans in Florida and Ohio were all 5 Star plans. 

Some thoughts on the insurtechs, why the hype didn’t quite pan out, and the damage they may have done [TTA 7 July 2023].

Why the ‘insurtechs’ didn’t revolutionize health insurance–and the damage they may have done

July 7, 2023 | by

crystal-ballIce water on hopes that many placed in ‘insurtechs’. This is the umbrella term that healthcare dubbed the upstart tech-enabled, health tech-friendly US payers which were supposed to deliver health insurance plans more efficiently (buy online!), more conveniently using apps and telehealth, with strong networks and at a lower delivery cost to consumers, from those who needed individual plans to Medicare Advantage. Around 2019-2020, these insurers gained billions in funding before going public through IPO or SPAC: Bright Health’s $500 million Series E in 2020 was only a chunk of their total $2.4 billion; Oscar Health raised $1.6 billion, Clover Health $1.3 billion. All three have struggled to stay clear of the insolvency precipice, with Friday Health Plans going over [TTA 23 June]. Bright Health Group will be exiting the insurance business after this year with the stock sale of their plans to Molina Healthcare–provided they survive to Q1 2024 [TTA 6 July]. Oscar and Clover have exited states and cut back offerings. In April, in a real retrenching, Oscar hired on Mark Bertolini, late of Aetna, pushing back a founder to an operational role. 

This Editor, in a marketing assessment for a client two years ago, believed as many did that Insurtechs Were The Future. At the very least, their practices would be adopted by the legacy insurers: easy online enrollment, lower premiums, predictive analytics, machine learning, digital documentation, online health education via apps, outsourcing areas such as customer service 24/7 and even marketing. Even those like Cigna through their Ventures arm bet some millions on insurtechs redefining payer-member relationships and payer structure, gaining better margins at profitable lines of business like Medicare Advantage (MA) and special needs plans (SNPs). After all, these plans did have people with decades of experience at insurers in their management, didn’t they, and they’d know what NOT to do. (And that’s the problem with gazing into crystal balls…eyestrain.)

Marissa Plescia’s article in MedCityNews is an excellent review on why the insurtechs’ centre did not hold. Key points made from her dive among the experts:

  • They underpriced and took heavy losses to grow their member base
  • They didn’t understand that some ‘inefficiencies’ in the health insurance market exist for reasons–perhaps not good ones, like state mandates through their departments of banking and insurance, but they exist and cannot be ignored. [Ed.–health education for MA has to be provided or at least available in written form in most if not all states]. Compliance can’t be skirted or ignored. Were they paying attention to the compliance of their plans?
  • They didn’t pay provider claims efficiently or at all [the SSM lawsuit of Bright]–a nifty way to lose networks and be sued by states, very damaging if the network wasn’t all that competitive to begin with.
  • Contracted rates with providers weren’t competitive. Were they managing risk adjusting coding well? 
  • Did they leverage sales channels beyond online such as brokers and their provider network? What about customer service?
  • The plans were not sticky enough to create some loyalty to an infamously non-loyal product

The insurtechs perhaps expected the technology to do too much–and for legacy payers to not catch up to them if they weren’t already moving there. Another problem–they (largely) were.

Disruption–but not the Clayton Christensen definition. Their disruption so far has been financial and legal (insolvency, cracked SPACs, lawsuits, share prices below $1.00, and delistings pending), loss of coverage for members; unpaid providers. With this track record, investors will avoid this category beyond the legacies. States won’t approve new plans from new companies. (This Editor believes that there are some overlooked positives such as inclusion in marketing of specialized and underserved groups, as well as some forced streamlining of processes.) There will be survivors–Alignment Health, kind of a below-the-radar operation and an afterthought in funding at $375 million, is in a few states and is mentioned. It’s also hard to bet against Bertolini leading Oscar–except that this is maybe Act V for him and he’s had his share of bunts and misses (bunt–ActiveHealth Management, misses–Healthagen, CarePass, iTriage) before his contentious departure from CVS. But in this particular widening gyre, while more revelations will be at hand, innovative newcomers in health plans won’t be seen for a long time, if ever. If the saga of airline deregulation (1980-1995) is a model, payer disruption just took a fraction of that time.

Insurtechs in the widening gyre: Bright Health sued for claims non-payment, fined $1M by Colorado; Clover Health lays off 10%, outsources operations

April 20, 2023 | by

When the centre cannot hold, more revelations are at hand.

Bright Health, facing insolvency and a violation of a liquidity covenant by the end of this month, is now facing a lawsuit by health system SSM Health in the US District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. At issue: payment of $13.1 million for 2,541 unpaid claims incurred for services SSM provided to Bright Health members between 1 January 2020 and 7 February 2023. This three-year plus timespan is not a simple glitch. SSM alleges in the suit that it provided $15.6 million worth of services in total to Bright Health plan members across facilities in three regions. In Oklahoma, SSM Health’s base, Bright exited Oklahoma’s Affordable Care Act exchange in December 2022 while under investigation by regulators. SSM has no contract with Bright to discount services in return for access to Bright’s network so charges the ‘rack rate’. The lawsuit docket is listed here though PACER is restricted access. FierceHealthcare

Bright Health is also under serious challenge at the state level. It was fined $1 million by the Colorado Division of Insurance (DOI) for violations during 2021-22. According to the DOI release, the complaints and violations centered on four areas: 1) failure to pay provider claims according to Colorado law; 2) failure to communicate with their members; 3) inability to accurately process consumer payments and accounts; 4) untimely processing of claims for physical and behavioral health coverage. $500,000 must be paid now, with the remainder held for specific improvement and compliance with metrics. Department of Regulatory Agencies (DORA) release  Bright is also under investigation in Tennessee, Texas, and Florida; it is under regulatory supervision in Florida and Tennessee with Texas considering receivership. Bright Health shares today closed at $0.164 and is on the verge of being delisted from the NYSE. Our recent coverage here.

New Jersey’s Clover Health, while not near the extremis that Bright is in, is cutting and outsourcing its way to profitability. Announced on Monday was a ‘corporate restructuring’ cut of 10% or 66 employees, based on public estimates of 656 (Pitchbook). Simultaneously, Clover’s CEO, Andrew Toy, announced outsourcing of core Medicare Advantage health plan operations to UST HealthProof in a move to increase operational efficiencies and reduce administrative costs. Both the layoffs and the UST implementation are expected to incur a 2023 first-half charge of $7-9 million, shifting to a $30 million savings beginning in 2024. Both moves were predictable as the company posted an $84 million loss in Q4 2022, a slight narrowing over prior year. Clover release, FierceHealthcare    Clover shares on Nasdaq were also below the delisting threshold at $0.80. Also industry analyst Ari Gottlieb on its overdue-ness on LinkedIn.