Mid-week roundup: Pear Therapeutics’ Chapter 11; Workit Health pinkslips 100; Outcome Health principals convicted of $1B fraud

Pear Therapeutics ran out of runway and is in the drink. On Friday, CEO Corey McCann announced in a post on LinkedIn that the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and has laid off 170 employees, including him. Dr. McCann will continue on the board and as a compensated consultant, while chief operating and financial officer Christopher D.T. Guiffre will remain through the Chapter 11 process along with about 15 employees to manage the asset sale process, limited operations, and transition on behalf of the debtors.

According to their Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) 8-K filing, terminated employees were paid through April 7, 2023, received two weeks’ salary as severance, and were asked to sign a separation agreement, which includes a general release of claims against the company resulting in a $1.2 million charge.

Only last month, Pear announced that it was exploring ‘strategic alternatives’ including a sale or being acquired. According to the release, the debtors are still seeking a sale of the whole business or to part out specific assets. Now such sales and the bidding process must be approved by the US Bankruptcy Court in Delaware. Release  The sale is anticipated for May.

Another behavioral health casualty in a model that proved unworkable. Pear developed and marketed Prescription Digital Therapeutics (PDTs) concentrated in behavioral health and substance use including opioid use disorder. While these seemed to be accepted by providers, patients, and some payers, payment didn’t materialize from the last, according to Dr. McCann’s LinkedIn post. According to Forbes, “There were more than 45,000 prescriptions written for Pear’s products in 2022, but only around half were filled and the company was able to collect payment for only 41% of those.” The other factors were price and reimbursement. Pear’s products averaged $1,195, which took them out of private payment. Only a limited number of commercial insurers and Medicaid plans would pay for them. Medicare did not. In 2022, Pear reported an operating loss of $123.4 million on $12.7 million in revenue, which doesn’t fly in 2023.

This is quite a change from the heady days of 2021, when Pear went public on Nasdaq via a SPAC in December, raising about $175 million in additional funding. A sign of trouble was that the raise was far less than the anticipated $400 million. At that time, Pear was valued at about $1.6 billion. Prior to the SPAC, they had raised about $284 million through Series D funding (Crunchbase)  Mobihealthnews, MedCityNews

Another virtual behavioral health company facing loss of business is Workit Health, This is due to the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) planned return to the in-person visit requirement for Schedule III-V non-narcotic controlled medications. Workit is a virtual therapy/treatment company for alcohol, stimulant, and opioid abuse, a crowded field. The company, rationally, is cutting 100 staff in anticipation of a drop in activity. To date, it has over $130 million in funding through a Series C, not a lot.  Behavioral Health Business  Also TTA 15 March on the DEA rule debate

Outcome Health–the other late 2010’s scandal after Theranos–had its denouement in a Federal court in Chicago yesterday (11 April). Convicted of $1 billion in fraud were:

  • Rishi Shah, 37, the co-founder and former CEO of Outcome Health: five counts of mail fraud, 10 counts of wire fraud, two counts of bank fraud, and two counts of money laundering
  • Shradha Agarwal, 37, the former president of Outcome: five counts of mail fraud, eight counts of wire fraud, and two counts of bank fraud
  • Brad Purdy, 33, former chief operating officer and chief financial officer: five counts of mail fraud, five counts of wire fraud, two counts of bank fraud, and one count of false statements to a financial institution

Each count carries specific maximums of between 10 to 30 years which are usually served concurrently. Sentencing for the three executives and for three other employees who had pleaded guilty to lesser charges will be at a date to be determined. SEC charges are pending against the executives, along with Ashik Desai, former chief growth officer, who testified against his former bosses in the criminal trial and was one of the three who pleaded guilty.

Outcome delivered patient education on screens in doctor’s offices and circa 2016 was one of the hottest companies in Chicago. During the pandemic, it merged with PatientPoint. Their problem was inflating their ad delivery numbers to their sponsors such as Pfizer, Biogen, and Sanofi. This puffery included third-party analyses of the ads’ effectiveness, e.g. for prescriptions written. This was exposed by the Wall Street Journal in October 2017. Advertiser makegoods and clawbacks from lenders in the millions resulted. TTA 29 Jan 2018   But the executive crew above plus the other three employees concealed the under-delivery problem, faked revenue numbers, and presented them for debt financing plus equity funding in 2016-17 that rewarded them richly–thus the Federal fraud charges. Mobihealthnews, FierceHealthcare, DOJ release  TTA’s coverage from that time here

Let’s hope for more cheerful news out of HIMSS next week.

Healthcare ad/patient ed network PatientPoint combining with once-hot Outcome Health

Can’t retreat from advertising in a doctor’s office, at least in the US. Point of care ad/patient education ad network giant PatientPoint is combining with one-time unicorn Outcome Health. The combined company, called PatientPoint Health Technologies, will operate under the PatientPoint brand. The transaction is effective immediately and the company will be headquartered in Cincinnati. Financials are not disclosed, but claimed to reach 150,000 providers and 750 million patient visits a year.

Management of the combined company, and all the senior leadership, is from PatientPoint: CEO Mike Collette, Chief Client Officer Linda Ruschau, CFO Pat O’Brien, and Chief Provider Officer Chris Martini. The only two carry-overs from Outcome Health mentioned in the announcement are tech executives Glenn Keighley and Sean Barden. CEO Matt McNally and COO Nandini Ramani, who stabilized the company after Outcome’s 2017 advertiser fraud scandal, are thanked but not remaining with the company. The Outcome Health website has no leadership page and popups on every page announcing the new company. 

PatientPoint is now majority-owned by a group of investors, including funds managed by L Catterton and Littlejohn & Co., LLC. Both funds also backed Outcome Health, so one can assume their role in engineering the combination; the word ‘acquisition’ is nowhere to be found.

One-time $5.5bn unicorn Outcome Health lost its horn, rainbow sparkle, and its Chicago high-rise office building in autumn 2017 when Big Pharma/Biotech companies like Pfizer, Sanofi SA, and Biogen Inc. discovered that their advertising exposure was wildly inflated, affecting tens of millions in ad revenue, embarrassing investors like Goldman Sachs and Alphabet. By 2019, their principals were in Federal District Court in Chicago: former Chief Executive Rishi Shah, former President Shradha Agarwal, and former executives Brad Purdy (COO/CFO), and Executive VP Ashik Desai. Mr. Desai cooperated with the prosecution, leaving the rest to their tender mercies. The trial, now classified as a $1bn fraud, is still pending. PatientPoint release, MM&M, Chicago Tribune. TTA’s back file on Outcome Health here.

The Theranos Story, ch. 69: Elizabeth Holmes ‘faked it till she made it’–like other Silicon Valley startups? (Updated)

Lifestyles of the Rich, Famous, and Busted, Silicon Valley Style. As promised by the prosecution in the cases being brought against Elizabeth Holmes, the CEO/founder of Theranos, and separately with COO Ramesh ‘Sunny’ Balwani, they are proceeding with filings that connect Theranos’ continued defrauding of investors with Holmes’ extravagant lifestyle and desire for fame. “The causal connection between Defendant’s fraud and the benefits at issue is strong,” the filing stated, going on to detail how the fraud funded hotels, private jet travel, and “multiple assistants” paid by the company who also assisted with her personal needs.  “In addition to the tangible benefits that she received from her fraud, she also was the beneficiary of a great deal of favorable attention from the media, business leaders, and dignitaries”. Sustaining the illusion was necessary to continue the lifestyle and recognition.

Countering the prosecution filing on Friday was–of course–a defense filing that attributed Silicon Valley’s ‘fake it till you make it’ startup culture as a rationale for Holmes’ and Theranos’ actions. That filing states “founders in this area frequently use exaggeration and dramatic promises to generate needed attention for their companies and attract capital.” The “culture of secrecy” that concealed Theranos’ fraud?  “…if it is admitted Ms. Holmes surely could present evidence that other Silicon Valley start-ups used similar practices, and that persons at Theranos were aware of these practices.” In November, they also filed to block as ‘unfairly prejudicial’ any mention of Holmes’ lifestyle as irrelevant to her guilt or fraud. 

Another fake was pretending that problems didn’t exist and everything was just ducky. The prosecution also introduced emails that confirmed Holmes’ direct awareness of problems with the blood tests in 2014. One example was from her brother Christian, who worked in product management. It requested a meeting to discuss a customer complaint where it was “pretty obvious that we have issues with calcium, potassium and sodium specifically.” According to the filing, “Theranos emails contain many examples of customer complaints routinely being escalated” to Elizabeth Holmes and other senior company personnel. At trial, the evidence will show that defendant shaped Theranos’s response to those complaints, prioritizing the company’s reputation over patient safety.” This Editor would argue that it’s no different with car manufacturers (Ford and the now lower-case GM) than startups to spin a response, but the proper reaction to clinical product faults would be to pull back the offending tests and solve the problem before going any further. But the Edison lab and their technology didn’t work.

Updated with further analysis. In retrospect, it’s obvious that Theranos crossed the ethical line between massive hype (expected) and outright fraud (not), which is why the defense is fighting so hard to keep Silicon Valley Lifestyle and Startup Culture out of the case unless it can be spun their way. A key: Holmes’ emotional state and a psychiatric evaluation have also been introduced by the defense, countered by the prosecution. In this case, the fraud was based on dual ethical nightmares, the first worse than the second: faking of medical results, then defrauding small and large investors by faking company performance. Too many just wanted to believe, like the X Files. But we should not forget another high-profile hype and fraud that happened around the same time, Outcome Health [TTA’s articles here].  Outcome Health’s fraud was strictly financial–ad performance falsification leading to fraud and money laundering. They defrauded Big Pharma advertising and some of the largest global investors like Goldman Sachs. The Federal lawsuits on Outcome have gone very quiet after settlements, plea bargains, and COVID halting court actions.

Thanks in large part to Theranos and Outcome Health, that startup culture is mostly kaput. The lessons are learned–we believe. A modicum of modesty along with a large dose of telehealth/telemedicine/data analytics is The 2020-2021 Thing. A lasting effect? Perhaps. Small-batch blood testing is only now recovering from being radioactive.

Before the start of the company’s collapse in 2016, Theranos had raised a reported $900 million ($700 million in some accounts) and was privately valued at $9 bn. Few of the investors clawed back their money. Fraud doesn’t work. It never works.

The trial in Federal District Court, San Jose, is now scheduled for jury selection 13 July. It was moved just before Christmas from 9 March by Judge Edward J. Davila due to California’s COVID-19 surge (MassDevice). So here we are five years later It promises to be popcorn-worthy, with possible appearances by famous men such as Henry Kissinger, Rupert Murdoch, and former Defense Secretary James Mattis. CNBC, Bloomberg For those interested in the full sturm und drang by chapter, it is here.

Outcome Health’s Desai reaches settlement with DOJ, SEC

Ashik Desai, the former chief growth officer of point-of-care advertising firm Outcome Health, settled the charges against him brought in Federal court by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The filing was on 4 February. Monetary relief and/or penalties against him will be disclosed at a later date.

Last month, Mr. Desai pleaded guilty to the charges and announced cooperation with the authorities on the criminal charges of securities fraud related to Outcome Health’s capital raises of about $1 bn during 2011 into 2017. Similarly, his former analysts Kathryn Choi and Oliver Han did the same at the end of January.

Remaining are the senior executives who have all entered pleas of  ‘not guilty’: founders Rishi Shah and Shradha Agarwal, both of Chicago, and Brad Purdy, their former COO and CFO, all in their 30s. All of them blame Mr. Desai, who is presently 26 and started at Outcome Health as an intern.  Pass the popcorn for a dramatic tale of complex and multi-layered fraud, likely in the spring. Becker’s Health IT and CIO Report, Chicago Tribune  Also TTA 17 Dec and 3 Dec

Outcome Health analysts plead guilty, cooperate with Federal prosecutors

Two financial analysts who worked at Outcome Health and reported to former EVP of business operations/chief growth officer Ashik Desai, changed their ‘not guilty’ pleas to ‘guilty’ earlier this month. Kathryn Choi and Oliver Han were charged with wire fraud by Federal prosecutors. As part of their guilty plea, they will cooperate with prosecutors, as did their former boss Mr. Desai.

As reported in our earlier articles, Ms. Choi and Mr. Han are alleged to have created statements to deceive company auditors and providing advertisers with false patient engagement metrics on Outcome Health’s tablets. Both were hired in 2014 and placed on leave in late 2017. While the charges they face carry a maximum penalty of five years, their cooperation may lead to far lighter sentences.

Their change of plea was rather predictable, given that two fairly young and junior staffers faced Federal charges in a classic squeeze play to obtain further information on the big fish, former Chief Executive Rishi Shah, former President Shradha Agarwal, and former executive Brad Purdy (COO/CFO), who face real prison time and large financial penalties. All three have pleaded not guilty.

Outcome Health’s principals are charged with 26 criminal charges of fraud in their funding raises of over $1 bn from 2011 to 2017. Advertisers were defrauded for ads which never ran in medical audiences and third-party studies were manipulated to enhance their results. The indictment details deception of their investors, lenders, and their own auditors for profit and misrepresenting to advertisers their delivery of actual advertising in doctors’ offices. 

Chicago Tribune, Crain’s Chicago BusinessEarlier TTA articles: 3 Dec, 12 Dec, 17 Dec

Outcome Health founders Shah, Agarwal plead not guilty in Federal court

As expected, the co-founders of in-office health information/advertising firm Outcome Health today (Monday) pleaded not guilty in the Northern District of Illinois Federal Court in Chicago. Of a total of 26 counts in the Federal indictment, Rishi Shah, the company’s former CEO, has been charged with six counts of mail fraud, 12 counts of wire fraud and two counts each of bank fraud and money laundering. Shradha Agarwal, the former president, has a somewhat lighter charge count of six counts of mail fraud, nine counts of wire fraud and two counts of bank fraud. Both were released on bond: $20 million for Mr. Shah, $10 million for Ms. Agarwal. Crain’s Chicago Business, may require free registration.

The charges relate to deception layered around company performance as detailed in our 3 December article–overstatement of advertising placement and delivery, manipulating third-party data on patient engagement on Outcome’s tablets, and fraudulently stating results to auditors. This was used to leverage nearly half a billion of a total $1 bn raise by major firms such as Goldman Sachs, Alphabet, and the Pritzker fund.

Last week, we covered the pleas of Ashik Desai, former EVP of business operations/chief growth officer (guilty) and Brad Purdy, former COO/CFO (not guilty). Mr. Desai, interrupted from his graduate studies at Wharton, is cooperating with the prosecutors; Mr. Purdy is blaming Mr. Desai.

A podcasted discussion on Crain’s Daily Gist has expressed the opinion that some in tech and healthcare, especially in Chicago, believe the list of charges and heavy penalties are ‘unusual’ and ‘extreme’ for a startup, considering that the revelations started four years ago, the accused stepped down two years ago. and restitution has been made to the defrauded companies. Moreover, the business and the model was not far fetched or pie-in-sky–it was a reasonable model, according to report John Pletz. The company continues in business, albeit scaled down. Mr. Pletz believes that the outcome of Outcome Health will be far more due diligence on investors’ part (accentuated by the WeWork/Softbank crash in the same car) on startups. “Failure is expected–fraud is not.” The resolution of the charges will also be far in the future, perhaps years, due to this being an extraordinarily complicated case. There will be further hearings in January, but do expect it to drag on. A mini-surprise in his commentary was stating that the analysts may turn their plea to guilty. 

“There were practices going on there that were wrong”: Outcome Health’s Desai pleads guilty, cooperates with DOJ.

Perhaps the smartest move, under really, truly bad circumstances. Ashik Desai, the former executive vice president of business operations/chief growth officer of point-of-care health information/advertising company Outcome Health, ‘copped a plea’ this past Monday to felony wire fraud charges. According to the Chicago Tribune, Assistant US Attorney Matthew Madden told Judge Thomas M. Durkin of the Northern District of Illinois Federal Court in Chicago that Mr. Desai is cooperating with the investigation. “When I was at Outcome Health, there were practices going on there that were wrong,” Mr. Desai said, understatedly, during his court appearance Monday. “I participated in those practices that ended up defrauding Outcome’s customers.”

According to the article and other sources (WTTW), Mr. Desai is only 26; he started at Outcome as an intern when it was still Context Media and departed in 2017. With continued cooperation, the prosecution is recommending only 10 years in prison, half of what a conviction might bring at the statutory maximum of 20 years. He was released on bond and surrendered his passport.

The multiple and most serious charges in the indictment are for the two founders, Rishi Shah and Shradha Agarwal, both of Chicago, and Brad Purdy, their former COO and CFO, all in their early 30s. These are criminal charges of fraud relating to their capital raises of about $1 bn during 2011 into 2017, deceiving their investors, lenders, and their own auditors for profit and misrepresenting to advertisers their delivery performance.

On Monday 9 December, Mr. Purdy pleaded not guilty to six counts each of mail fraud and wire fraud, two counts of bank fraud and one count of making false statements to a financial institution. His counsel, not unexpectedly but amusingly for those of us who are experienced in the corporate pecking order and what exactly a CFO is responsible for, stated: “Ashik Desai and several of his underlings committed a massive fraud. The evidence will show Brad Purdy was not part of that fraud,” he said. “Evidence is going to show Ashik Desai repeatedly lied to Brad and others to conceal his fraud from people like Brad.” Mr. Purdy also was released on bond and surrendered his passport.

Two of those underlings, Kathryn Choi and Oliver Han, pleaded not guilty on Thursday 5 December to their respective charges of wire fraud. They face five years maximum if convicted. In this Editor’s opinion, they were indicted to bring forth additional information to buttress the major charges on Mr. Desai and the three top executives. As ‘small fry’ with at most a little profit sharing, they are sideshows–easy to pressure. They may truly spill the beans if they and their counsel sense that things are going badly–if they have any more beans to spill. 

Mr. Shah and Ms. Agarwal are scheduled to appear in court next Monday, 16 December. They have previously stated that they will plead not guilty (FiercePharma). Flight risk is undoubtedly a concern for the prosecution regarding Ms. Agarwal. According to this Refinery29  interview from 2017, Ms. Agarwal is an Indian citizen and, while a long-time legal resident, not a naturalized American. Mr. Shah was born in the US. This cautionary Tale of the Unicorn, told in the Chicago Way, warns us all to be careful of what we see, are asked to do, sign on to–and sign off on.

SEC, DOJ charges Outcome Health founders Shah and Agarwal, others, with $487 million fraud, 26 counts of indictment (updated)

All the points of information here. While we here in the US were enjoying our Thanksgiving feasts of turkey, steak, lobster, and lasagna, Outcome Health founders former Chief Executive Rishi Shah, former President Shradha Agarwal, and former executives Brad Purdy (COO/CFO), and Executive VP Ashik Desai, were being served a vastly different dish on 25 November. Underreported in the run-up to the holiday were two major legal actions against these individuals:

  • SEC charges of $487 million in investor fraud by “misrepresent(ing) the company’s business successes while raising hundreds of millions of dollars from unsuspecting investors”, billing clients (primarily pharmaceutical companies) for ads that never ran in medical offices, and manipulating third-party studies to make the company’s ad delivery look more effective than it actually was to create the impression of meteoric growth. The falsification trail was such that even they had trouble matching up their claims versus actual in their ‘selling of futures’.
  • 26 counts from a Department of Justice grand jury indictment on criminal charges of fraud relating to their capital raises of about $1 bn during 2011 into 2017 and their business practices. The indictment alleges deception of their investors, lenders, and their own auditors for profit and misrepresenting to advertisers their delivery of actual advertising in doctors’ offices which they may or may not have had, in extreme and additional detail to the SEC complaint. Arraignments for the defendants started on Tuesday 3 Dec.

Two young analysts, Kathryn Choi and Oliver Han, reported to Mr. Desai and are being charged with wire fraud. They are alleged to have created statements to deceive company auditors and providing advertisers with false patient engagement metrics on Outcome Health’s tablets. Both were hired in 2014 and placed on leave in late 2017. This action is highly unusual in reaching down to this level and naming two young subordinates.

One-time unicorn Outcome Health is, of course, still in business, selling advertising and educational materials at point-of-care, having settled with the SEC in October for $70 million in advertiser make-goods [TTA 31 Oct]. It also restructured/recapitalized in May by selling a majority stake to private equity firm Littlejohn & Co. In coming down to earth, the posturing of the executives should be less than two years ago, when Outcome was going to build its own Chicago office building–but this early October article from FiercePharma hardly moderates the healthcare change-agent hype for what is really POC advertising to inform and mostly distract patients who wait…and wait.

Additional information:

In this Editor’s view, once both SEC and DOJ are double-teamed on an indictment, avoiding Club Fed will be extremely difficult for the four main executives. (One assumes their US passports have been confiscated.) There is a huge amount of financial fraud leading to losses by some powerful companies. Even when losses are small, the Feds get their man most of the time. This Editor had a view of this at a distance, as the CEO of a company where she formerly worked was convicted of financial fraud in an enterprise formed after that company. He and his accomplice are serving five years in a Federal prison. Not even Elizabeth Holmes is facing the full fury of both Federal agencies, and she’s facing only nine counts in her indictment. 

Short takes: Outcome Health pays up, Teladoc’s up in double-digits, Walgreens closing 40% of clinics, a health kiosk for hospital employees?

Outcome Health settles with DOJ, pays $70 million. Former health unicorn ‘patient ed’ company Outcome Health entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the US Department of Justice (DOJ). In return for settling up with its advertisers, with a fund now at $70 million, it has overhauled its procedures, including third-party auditing and internal controls. That includes a near-complete change of management. A summary of its earlier problems is here. Release

It also looks like Teladoc is on the right path after last year’s financial and moral rocky patch and this year’s NCQA corrective action with Q3 revenue of $138 million, up 24 percent year-to-year, and nine-month revenue up 34 percent to $396.8 million. The year forecast is tracking with total revenue estimated at $149 million to $153 million and the losses pared down to between $5 to 9 million. Seeking Alpha

The news that Walgreens Boots is closing 40 percent of its US clinics–about 150–by end of year is perhaps a sign that the in-store ‘minute clinic’ is not producing the kind of traffic that’s wanted. They will retain the clinics run in partnership with healthcare providers. In August, Walgreens also announced the closure of about 200 stores, about 3 percent of their national total. Is this also a concession that CVS and its clinic strategy are edging out Walgreens? Often the two chains are located within minutes (sic) of each other. USA Today

A city hospital is an unlikely place for a health diagnostic kiosk, especially for employees, but Tampa General Hospital is trying out neighboring Clearwater’s OnMed stations in its locations. The station is connected to OnMed’s virtual clinic via high-definition video and multiple diagnostic tools. The station is also its own pharmacy, able to store up to 1,000 different medications, which are dispensed if prescribed by the doctor on the consult. Interestingly, employees quoted in the article seemed to like it as fast and convenient–and free for their use. Tampa General and OnMed plan to co-brand in the area and roll out about 20 for public use, at an estimated $65-75 per visit. Tampa Bay Times

 

Health tech bubble watch: Rock Health’s mid-2019 funding assessment amid Big IPOs (updated: Health Catalyst, Livongo, more)

Updated for IPOs and analysis. The big time IPOs add extra bubbles to the digital health bath. Rock Health’s mid-year digital health market update continues its frothy way with a topline of $4.2 bn across 180 deals invested in digital health during the first half of 2019. 2019 is tracking to last year’s spending rate across fewer deals and is projected to end the year at $8.4 bn and 360 deals versus 2018’s $8.2 bn and 376 deals.

This year has been notable for Big IPOs, which have been absent from the digital health scene for three years. Exits come in three flavors: mergers and acquisitions (43 in their count so far), IPOs, and shutdowns (like Call9). IPOs are a reasonable outcome of last year’s trend of mega deals over $100 million and a more direct way for VCs to return their money to investors. So far in 2019, 30 percent of venture dollars went to these mega deals. (Rock Health tracks only US digital health deals over $2 million, so not a global picture.)

Reviewing the IPOs and pending IPOs to date:

  • Practice intake and patient management system Phreesia closed its NYSE IPO of 10.7 million shares at $18 per share on 22 July. The company earned approximately $140.6 million and the total gross proceeds to the selling stockholders were approximately $51.6 million for a value over $600 million. The market cap as of 26 July exceeded $949 million with shares rising past $26. Not bad for a company that raised a frugal $92.6 million over seven rounds since 2005.  Yahoo Finance, Crunchbase
  • Chronic condition management company Livongo’s picture is frothier. Their 22 July SEC filing has their IPO at 10.7 million shares at $24 to $26 per share offered on NASDAQ. This would total a $267.5 million raise and a $2.2 bn valuation. This is a stunning amount for a company with reportedly $55 million at the end of its most recent reporting period, increasing losses, and rising cash burn. Livongo raised $235 million since 2014 from private investors. Crunchbase 
  • Analytics company Health Catalyst’s IPO, which will probably take place this week on NASDAQ with Livongo’s, expects to float 7 million shares. Shares will be in a range of $24 to $25 with a raise in excess of $171 million. Their quarterly revenue is above $35 million with an operating loss of $9.8 million. Since 2008, they’ve raised $377 million. IPO analysts call both Livongo’s and Health Catalyst’s IPOs ‘essentially oversubscribed’. Investors Business Daily, Crunchbase
    • UPDATE: Both Livongo and Health Catalyst IPOs debuted on Thursday 25 July, with Livongo raising $356 million on an upsized 12.7 million shares at $28/share, while Health Catalyst’s 7 million shares brought in $182 million at $26/share.  Friday’s shares closed way up from the IPOs Livongo at $38.12 and $38.30 for Health Catalyst. Bubbly indeed! Investors Business Daily, Yahoo Finance
  • Change Healthcare is also planning a NASDAQ IPO at a recently repriced $13 per share, raising $557.7 million from 42.8 million shares. With the IPO, Change is also offering an equity raise and senior amortizing note to pay off its over $5 bn in debt. The excruciating details are here. Investors here are taking a much bigger chance than with the above IPOs, but the market action above will be a definite boost for Change.
  • Connected fitness device company Peloton, after raising $900 million, is scheduled to IPO soon after a confidential SEC filing. (UPDATED–Ed. Note: Included as in the Rock Health report; however this Editor believes that their continued inclusion of Peleton in digital health is specious and should be disregarded by those looking at actual funding trends in health tech.) Forbes

Rock Health itself raised the ‘bubble’ question in considering 2018 results. Their six points of a bubble are:

  1. Hype supersedes business fundamentals
  2. High cash burn rates
  3. High valuations decoupled from fundamentals
  4. Surge of cash from new investors
  5. Fraud or misuse of funds
  6. Unclear exit pathways

This Editor’s further analysis of these six points [TTA 21 Jan] wasn’t quite as reassuring as Rock Health’s. As in 2018, #2, #3, and #6 are rated ‘moderately bubbly’ with even Rock Health admitting that #2 had some added froth. #3–high valuations decoupled from fundamentals–is, in this Editor’s experience, the most daunting, as as it represents the widest divergence from reality and is the least fixable. The three new ‘digital health unicorns’ they cite are companies you’ve likely never heard of and in ‘interesting’ but not exactly mainstream niches in health tech except, perhaps, for the last: Zipline (medicine via drone to clinics in Rwanda and Ghana), Gympass (corporate employee gym passes), and Hims (prescription service and delivery).

Editor’s opinion: When there are too many companies with high valuations paired with a high ‘huh?’ quotient (#3)–that one is slightly incredulous at the valuation granted ‘for that??’–it’s time to take a step back from the screen and do something constructive like rebuild an engine or take a swim. Having observed or worked for companies in bubbles since 1980 in three industries– post-deregulation airlines in the 1980s, internet (dot.com) from the mid-1990s to 2001, first stage telecare/telehealth (2006-8), and healthcare today (Theranos/Outcome Health), a moderate bubble never, ever deflates–it expands, then bursts. The textbook #3 was the dot.com boom/bust; it not only fried internet companies but many vendors all over the US and kicked off a recession.

Rock Health also downplayed #5, fraud and misuse of funds. It’s hard to tell why with troubles around uBiome, Nurx, and Cleo in the news, Teladoc isn’t mentioned, but their lack of disclosure for a public company around critical NCQA accreditation only two months ago and their 2018 accounting problems make for an interesting omission [TTA 16 May]. (And absurdly, they excluded Theranos from 2018’s digital health category, yet include drones, gym passes, connected fitness devices…shall we go on?)

Rock Health’s analysis goes deeper on the private investment picture, particularly their interesting concept of ‘net liquidity overhang’, the amount of money where investors have yet to realize any return, as an indicator of the pressure investors have to exit. Pressure, both in healthcare and in early-stage companies, is a double-edged sword. There’s also a nifty annual IPO Watch List which includes the five above and why buying innovation works for both early-stage and mature healthcare companies. 

(Editor’s final note: The above is not to be excessively critical of Rock Health’s needed analysis, made available to us for free, but in line with our traditionally ‘gimlety’ industry view.)

SNF emergency telehealth provider Call9 shuts down most operations, after $34M raise (updated)

Is it a symptom of a bubble’s downside? In an interview with CNBC, Dr. Timothy Peck, the CEO of Call9, profiled in TTA only a month ago, confirmed that his company will be shutting down operations. Call9 provided embedded emergency first responders in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) on call to staff nurses. The first responders not only could provide immediate care to patients with over a dozen diagnostic tools, but also would connect via video to emergency doctors on call. 

Headquartered in Brooklyn, the shuttering of the four-year-old company has laid off over 100 employees as it winds down operations. They claimed 142,000 telemedicine visits and 11,000 patients who were treated via its services. In the past few months, Call9 had inked deals with Lyft for patient transportation and was expanding to Albany NY. They also operated a community paramedicine division utilizing their emergency doctor network.  

This Editor can now reveal that through a reliable industry source, I was informed of Call9’s difficulties earlier this month. Not wanting to ‘run with a rumor’, I contacted Dr. Peck. He confirmed to me information that later appeared in the CNBC article: that the company was refining its model in the face of a change in previous funders and working with some new partners to stay in a model with embedded clinical care specialists in nursing homes. While they would scale back, they still had current contracts. However, the changes in their model would mean that the company would be in a ‘bit of a stealth mode’. After we discussed the business situations that most early-stage health tech companies have faced with funding, we agreed to touch base in a few weeks when things developed.

CNBC, with a different source, had essentially the same information from Dr. Peck on the winding down of the company but in this case also confirmed layoffs, including a ‘pivot’ of the company into a different model around technology in nursing homes. They also confirmed that a part of the company, Call9 Medical, will remain in operations.

Update: Skilled Nursing News had additional detail on Call9’s partnerships which included SNF providers Centers Health Care, CareRite, and the Archdiocese of New York’s long-term care arm, ArchCare. Their first client was Central Island Healthcare, where Dr. Peck lived for three months testing the model. The article goes on with Central Island’s executive director explaining that he is now seeking a telemedicine provider, as they adjusted their services to Call9’s capabilities.

Payer providers included Anthem, Blue Cross Blue Shield, and Healthfirst, plus some Medicare Advantage plans, splitting the savings from avoiding unnecessary ER admissions. Another appeal made by the company for its services was to keep in place higher acuity–sicker–patients in SNFs who would otherwise have to go into the hospital.

As our Readers know, these pages have covered the comings and goings of many health tech and app companies. Some succeed on their own, are acquired/combined with others and go on in different form, or are bought out at their peak, leaving their founders and some employees cheerful indeed. On the other hand, and far more common: the demise of some is understandable, others regrettable, and nearly none of them are cause for celebration in our field–Theranos and Outcome Health being exceptions. This Editor has been a marketing head of two of them (now deceased except for their technology, out there somewhere), and has discussed marketing, funding, and business models with more startups and early-stage companies than she can count.

If anything, investors have less patience than they did back in the Grizzled Pioneer period of the early 2000s, when a $5 million round put together from a few personally (more…)

Where’s the evidence? Healthcare unicorns lack the proof and credibility of peer-reviewed studies.

Another sign that too many healthcare unicorns are decoupled from the rock-solid fundamental reality–that they work. Healthcare unicorns–those startups valued over $1 bn–are unicorns because they have patents, processes, or a line of business that has immense potential to be profitable. The standard in healthcare, unlike other tech, is the peer-reviewed study. Is this process or device effective based upon the study? Does this drug looks like it will work? Is this study validating, encouraging? Peer-reviewed research takes place before a drug or device goes into clinical trials — a precursor. It ensures a certain level of disclosure, validation, and transparency at an early stage.

Instead, these unicorns largely rely on ‘stealth research’–a term coined by Dr. John P.A. Ioannidis, the co-director of the Meta-Research Innovation Center at Stanford University (METRICS). He summed it up in his latest peer-reviewed paper, “Stealth research: lack of peer-reviewed evidence from healthcare unicorns” (co-authored with Ioana A. Cristea and Eli M. Cahan), published in the European Journal of Clinical Investigation 28 Jan: 

In 2014, one of us (JPAI) wrote a viewpoint article coining the term “stealth research” for touted biomedical innovation happening outside the peer-reviewed literature in a confusing mix of “possibly brilliant ideas, aggressive corporate announcements, and mass media hype.”

The term ‘stealth research’ was prompted to the author by the practices of Theranos–ironically, a company that started and was funded in the Stanford nexus. By the time Dr. Ioannidis’ viewpoint paper was published in JAMA in Feb 2015, Theranos had ballooned to a $9 bn valuation. His paper was the first to question Theranos’ science–and Theranos aggressively pushed back against Dr. Ioannidis, including their general counsel attempting to convince the author to recant his own writing. Three years later, we know the outcome.

This latest study concludes that there is a real dearth of peer-reviewed research among healthcare unicorns–and that it’s detrimental. It measured whether these unicorns published peer-reviewed articles and whether they publish highly-cited (in other publications) articles; compared them against companies with lower valuations; and whether founders or board members themselves impacted the scientific literature through their own citations.

The meta-study looked at 18 current and 29 exited healthcare unicorns. Highlights:

  • Two companies–23andMe and Adaptive Biotechnologies published almost half of all unicorn papers–196 combined
  • Three unicorns (Outcome Health, GuaHao and Oscar Health) had no published papers, and two more (Clover Health, Zocdoc) had published just one
  • Seven of the exited unicorns had zero to one papers
  • In fact, ‘there was a negative, non-statistically significant association between company valuation and number of published or highly-cited papers’

As our Readers know, Outcome Health had a little problem around artificially inflated advertising placement wrapped in health ed and placed in doctors’ offices [TTA 29 Jan 18]. Oscar and Clover Health are insurers. Zocdoc…well, we know their business model is to get as many doctors to sign up in their scheduling app and pay as much as possible. But it’s the drug and device companies that are especially worrisome in a stealth research model. The paper points out among other examples StemCentrx, bought for $10.2 bn in 2016 by AbbVie for its Rova T targeted antibody drug for cancer treatment, was halted at Phase III because it was not effective. Acerta Pharma, also focused on cancer treatments, was bought by AstraZeneca for $7.3 bn; two years ago, AstraZeneca had to withdraw the Acerta data and admit that Acerta falsified preclinical data for its drug.

The conclusions are that healthcare unicorns contribute minimally to relevant, high-impact published research, and that greater scrutiny by the scientific community through peer-reviewed research is needed to ensure credibility for the underlying work by these startups. “There is no need for numerous papers. Discrete pivotal, high-impact articles would suffice.”

This Editor returns to #5 on Rock Health’s Bubble Meter: high valuations decoupled from fundamentals. Based on this, the lack of publishing represents risk–to investors and to patients who would benefit from better vetted treatments. To these companies, however, the risk is in having their technology or researched poached–as well as the investment in time and money research represents.

The study authors point out several ways to minimize the risk, including collaborating with academic centers in research, validation without disclosing all technical details, secure patents, and contributing their technology to other research. A higher-risk way is to “withhold significant publications until successful validation from agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or the European Medicines Agency (EMA)” but usually investors won’t wait that long. ‘Stealth Research’ paper, TechCrunch review Hat tip to David Albert, MD, of AliveCor via Twitter

It’s not a bubble, really! Or developing? Analysis of Rock Health’s verdict on 2018’s digital health funding.

The doors were blown off funding last quarter, so whither the year? Our first take 10 January on Rock Health’s 2018 report was that digital health was a cheery, seltzery fizzy, not bubbly as in economic bubbles.  Total funding came in at $8.1 billion–a full $2.3 bn or 42 percent–over 2017’s $5.7 bn, as projected in Q3 [TTA 11 Oct]–which indicates confidence and movement in the right direction.

What’s of concern? A continued concentration in funding–and lack of exiting.

  • From Q3, the full year total added $1.3 bn ($6.8 bn YTD Q3, full year $8.1 bn) 
  • The deals continue to be bigger and fewer–368 versus 359 for 2017, barely a rounding error
  • Seed funding declined; A, B, C rounds grew healthily–and D+ ballooned to $59M from $28M in 2017, nearly twice as much as C rounds
  • Length of time between funding rounds is declining at all levels

Exits continue to be anemic, with no IPOs (none since 2016!) and only 110 acquisitions by Rock Health’s count. (Rock only counts US only deals over $2 million, so this does not reflect a global picture.)

It’s not a bubble. Really! Or is it a developing one? Most of the article delivers on conclusions why Rock Health and its advisors do not believe there is a bubble in funding by examining six key attributes of bubbles. Yet even on their Bubble Meter, three out of the six are rated ‘Moderately Bubbly’–#2, #3, and #5–my brief comments follow. 

  1. Hype supersedes business fundamentals (well, we passed this fun cocktail party chatter point about 2013)
  2. High cash burn rates (not out of line for early stage companies)
  3. Unclear exit pathways (no IPOs since ’16 which bring market scrutiny into play. Oddly, Best Buy‘s August acquisition of GreatCall, and the latter’s earlier acquisitions of Lively and Healthsense didn’t rate a mention)
  4. Surge of cash from new investors (rising valuations per #5–and a more prosperous environment for investments of all types)
  5. High valuations decoupled from fundamentals (Rock Health didn’t consider Verily’s billion, which was after all in January)
  6. Fraud or misuse of funds (Theranos, Outcome dismissed by Rock as ‘outliers’, but no mention of Zenefits or HealthTap)

Having observed bubbles since 1980 in three industries– post-deregulation airlines in the 1980s, internet (dot.com) in the 1990s, and healthcare today (Theranos/Outcome), ‘moderately’ doesn’t diminish–it builds to a peak, then bursts. Dot.com’s bursting bubble led to a recession, hand in hand with an event called 9/11.

This Editor is most concerned with the #5 rating as it represents the largest divergence from reality and is the least fixable. While Verily has basically functioned as a ‘skunk works’ (or shell game–see here) for other areas of Google like Google Health, it hardly justifies a billion-dollar investment on that basis alone. $2 bn unicorn Zocdoc reportedly lives on boiler-room style sales to doctors with high churn, still has not fulfilled its long-promised international expansion, and has ceased its endless promises of transforming healthcare. Peleton is a health tech company that plumps out Rock Health’s expansive view of Health Tech Reality–it’s a tricked out internet connected fitness device. (One may as well include every fitness watch made.)

What is the largest divergence from reality? The longer term faltering of health tech/telecare/telehealth companies with real books of business. Two failures readily come to mind: Viterion (founded in 2003–disclosure, a former employer of this Editor) and 3rings (2015). Healthsense (2001) and Lively were bought by GreatCall for their IP, though Healthsense had a LTC business. Withings was bought back by the founder after Nokia failed to make a go of it. Canary Care was sold out of administration and reorganized. Even with larger companies, the well-publicized financial and management problems of publicly traded, highly valued, and dominant US telemed company Teladoc (since 2015 losing $239 million) and worldwide, Tunstall Healthcare’s doldrums (and lack of sale by Charterhouse) feed into this. 

All too many companies apparently cannot get funding or the fresh business guidance to develop. It is rare to see an RPM survivor of the early ’00s like GrandCare (2005). There are other long-term companies reportedly on the verge–names which this Editor cannot mention.

The reasons why are many. Some have lurched back and forth from the abyss or have made strategic errors a/k/a bad bets. Others like 3rings fall into the ‘running out of road and time’ category in a constrained NHS healthcare system. Beyond the Rock Health list and the eternal optimism of new companies, business duration correlates negatively with success. Perhaps it is that healthcare technology acceptance and profitability largely rests on stony, arid ground, no matter what side of the Atlantic. All that money moves on to the next shiny object.(Babylon Health?) There are of course some exceptions like Legrand which has bought several strong UK companies such as Tynetec (a long-time TTA supporter) and Jontek.

Debate welcomed in Comments.

Related: Becker’s Hospital Review has a list of seven highly valued early stage companies that failed in 2018–including the Theranos fraud. Bubble photo by Marc Sendra martorell on Unsplash

It’s Official: CES is now a health tech event (updated)

CES is now, officially, a health tech event. It’s not just the timing before CES of the flashy but apparently cratering JP Morgan annual healthcare investment conference in the absurdly pricey venue of San Francisco (FierceBiotech on the #MoveJPM backlash; the general disillusion with it expressed well here). It’s the fact that whatever mainstreaming health tech has actually accomplished, it’s far better represented in Las Vegas. Always a place of beginnings, endings, fun, gambles taken, lack of sleep, and sore feet, health tech fits right in, big or small.

CES reported that 2019 boasted an increase of 25 percent health-related exhibitors and a 15 percent increase in the amount of floor space dedicated to health tech. One winner was a big gamble by a small company–Living in Digital Times, which organizes and stages the Digital Health SummitTen years later, it turned out to be right place, right time for the founders who work hard to keep it on trend. Lifestyle, robotics, self-care, assistive tech (even exoskeletons), wearables, cosmetic “wellness” devices like P&G’s Opté, and Alexa-type home assistants/robots all now fit into the CES purview. Trial balloons by young companies, AI-powered concept devices from big companies, watches (including the Apple-beater Move ECG from the revitalized Withings TTA 10 Oct 18 and Omron’s HeartGuide), and robots all appeared. Samsung again brought out a brace of concept robots. Last year’s Best of CES ElliQ is finally available for pre-order after three years at a measly $1,500. The humanoid Sophia brought a kid sister, the equally creepy Little Sophia, both of whom failed during this CNET video. Yes, Pepper from Softbank made its appearance and apparently didn’t wilt as it did last year.

Sleep tech was another hot item, with a spin on sleep diagnostics or improvement from many products. A brainwave product, Urgonight from France, claims to be able to train your brain to sleep better. (Send one to Rick Astley who was a poster child for not Sleeping.)  Mental health is a natural crossover into sleep tech and robots, with a $5,000 Japanese robot, Lovot, capable of responsive cuddling and comfort.

Best of the coverage:

  • CNET has probably the best coverage and articles on health which stick to the facts (slim in some cases as they are); anyone who wants to catch up with the feel and flavor of this three-ring circus can start and stay there. Their full show coverage is here.
  • Dr. Jayne at HISTalk also did an excellent health-related product roundup in her Curbside Consult column.
  • Mobihealthnews also has a very long running list of health tech pictures and announcements as part of its limited coverage, including the mea culpas and promised transparency of onetime health ed unicorn Outcome Health [TTA 29 Jan 18].

Beyond the plethora of products encouraging ever more to come forward, what ones will even make it to market, far more be winners? Aside from the Samsungs and P&Gs, which of these young companies planting their stake at CES will be there next year?  As in past CES, the wheel goes round and round, and where it stops, nobody knows–not even the JPM investors. 

2017’s transition in digital health funding: is it maturity or a reconsideration?

Rock Health’s topline for 2017 digital health funding is impressively upbeat, casting it as “the end of the beginning in digital health, the start of a new era with new challenges”. Digging into it, there is a continued slowing that Rock Health itself predicted back in their 3rd Quarter report [TTA 3 Oct 17]. It seems that the big did get bigger, but if you weren’t on the train in 2016 or prior, 2017 wasn’t the year you left the station. Their findings bear this out, keeping in mind that their tracking is for US companies with deals over $2 million in value, which excludes much of the action from young and international companies:

  • No digital health IPOs this year, in a weak year in general for IPOs
  • For the companies already in public markets, they outperformed the S&P 500 31 percent to 19 percent
  • Average deals hit an all-time high of $16.7M ($5.8 bn over 345 deals) 
  • Big money went to better-developed, more mature companies like Outcome Health and Peloton exercise equipment at $500 million and $325 million. Rock Health duly notes Outcome Health’s troubles since. (To this Editor, Peloton is not a digital health company despite its glitzy overlay of video and exercise community.)  
  • Seven $100 million + mega-deals front-loaded in the first half of the year. Second half’s sole big deal was genetic testing and data marketer 23andme. The dominant category of business? Consumer health information represented by Outcome, 23andme, PatientPoint, PatientsLikeMe, and ShareCare, most with a B2B2C model.
  • Looking at deals by stage, not surprisingly the funding at D and later rounds soared to an average size of $74 million (from 2016’s $46 million). Seed and A rounds’ average funding at $7 million, while the majority, hasn’t varied much since 2011. Series B funding was also flat at $17 million on average.
  • Exits continued to be weak, indicating the reality of healthcare investing being long haul. M&A deals declined for the second straight year to 119–18 percent fewer than 2016 and 36 percent fewer than 2015

Also Modern Healthcare.

This Editor’s opinion? One damper on 2017 was the $900 million credulously blown on Theranos. Call it the Theranos Effect.

As usual we will look at StartUp Health‘s always numerically bigger report after release, but this Editor’s bet is that it won’t be ‘crazy’ like earlier in 2017. 

Another unicorn loses its horn–Outcome Health finally loses the CEO and president

[grow_thumb image=”https://telecareaware.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/1107_unicorn_head_mask_inuse.jpg” thumb_width=”150″ /]Another Theranos? Outcome Health is a point of ‘sale’ advertising company that has wrapped itself in ‘behavior change technology’. It’s been a Chicago darling and closed a $500 million Series A led by Goldman Sachs and Alphabet only last May. Its business in ‘transforming healthcare’ is the prosaic but highly lucrative placement of monitors in doctors’ offices that provide relentless health educational content liberally laced with DTC sponsorship messages, free to the doctors but paid for by pharma companies. This also includes tablets, exam room demo wallboards, and Wi-Fi in offices. The Series A pushed up the company’s valuation to $5.5 bn and made its CEO a billionaire.

What it didn’t do, like Theranos, was deliver. Before October last year, advertisers, backed up by former employees’ testimony, realized that the data were inflated in several ways: number of screens in offices, verification of actual runs, match lists that didn’t match to the screens, made-up survey numbers, and puffed up third-party analyses of the ads’ effectiveness, e.g. for prescriptions written. A Wall Street Journal article in October last year exposed the practices. When advertisers are fleeced, they may get mad, but then they get even. There were reported refunds in the millions to Pfizer, plus millions in advertising make-goods to Sanofi SA and Biogen Inc. 250 ad campaigns are now in review across 40,000 doctors’ offices. A search for the guilty ensued, some culpable employees were suspended, the usual layoffs of 33 percent of the staff and belt-tightening ensued, and an outside person was hired to investigate and impose the usual ‘best practices’. Also MedCityNews

The mea culpas didn’t work because it’s real money and there were signs it was moving. In November, investors in that Series A, including Goldman Sachs, Alphabet, and Pritzker Group Venture Capital, attempted to claw back $225 million they gave to CEO Rishi Shah and President Shradha Agarwal held in a special fund. The investors accused them of moving the money. The court documents indicated they received subpoenas from the Justice Department (see Chicago Tribune below). The filing was in New York State Supreme Court, not in Illinois. Outcome’s response was to trumpet their integrity and that “the equity investors led by Goldman Sachs are misusing the court system to advance their own short-term, self-interest of winning an advantage over debt-holders — all to the detriment of the business, its employees and customers.” MedCityNews

Last week, they settled. Both Mr. Shah and Ms. Agarwal announced they are ‘stepping down’ from direct operations to become chairman and vice chair of the now seven-person board of directors, now including three independent directors and two representing investors. The investors, lenders, and founders are funneling $159 million to reduce the company’s debt by $77 million and buttress their operations. The COO is taking on interim CEO duties while the board searches for a new head. The release trumpets ‘reinvestment in the future’. And that HQ move to an ‘Outcome Tower’? Nixed. Illinois also pulled away two tax credit deals. Chicago TribuneMedCityNews

How three major investors didn’t do their ‘due diligence’ before writing big checks is beyond this Editor’s ken. This tale won’t be as drastic or lead to moral questions as Theranos did. There are no malfunctioning tests, misled patients and doctors– after all, it’s just advertising in offices paid by everyone’s favorite pharmas. But as yet another blot on healthcare transformation, like Theranos it’s turned into a corporate saga of posturing–ah, here’s a fig leaf to cover, a shoe to drop, and here’s your large feathered fan.